Since 1994, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) has sought to eliminate pay-to-play practices in the municipal securities market through its Rule G-37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business.[1]  Under the rule, certain contributions to elected officials of municipal securities issuers made by brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”), municipal finance professionals (“MFPs”) associated with dealers, and political action committees (“PACs”) controlled by dealers and their MFPs (“dealer-controlled PACs”)[2] may result in prohibitions on dealers from engaging in municipal securities business with such issuers for a period of two years from the date of any triggering contributions.

Rule G-37 requires dealers to record and disclose certain contributions to issuer officials, state or local political parties, and bond ballot campaigns, as well as other information, on Form G-37 to allow public scrutiny of such contributions and the municipal securities business of a dealer. In addition, dealers and MFPs generally are prohibited from soliciting others (including affiliates of the dealer or any PACs) to make contributions to officials of issuers with which the dealer is engaging or seeking to engage in municipal securities business, or to political parties of a state or locality where the dealer is engaging or seeking to engage in municipal securities business. Dealers and MFPs also are prohibited from circumventing Rule G-37 by direct or indirect actions through any other persons or means.[3]

Due to changes in the financial markets since the adoption of Rule G-37, many dealers and MFPs have become affiliated with a broad range of other entities in increasingly diverse organizational structures.  Some of these affiliated entities (including but not limited to banks, bank holding companies, insurance companies and investment management companies) have formed or otherwise maintain relationships with PACs (“affiliated PACs”) and other political organizations, many of which may make contributions to issuer officials.  Such relationships raise questions regarding the extent to which affiliated PACs may effectively be controlled by dealers or their MFPs and thereby constitute dealer-controlled PACs whose contributions are subject to Rule G-37.  Further, such relationships raise concerns regarding whether the contributions of such affiliated PACs, even if not viewed as dealer-controlled PACs, may be used by dealers or their MFPs to circumvent Rule G-37 as indirect contributions for the purpose of obtaining or retaining municipal securities business.

The MSRB remains concerned that individuals and firms subject to Rule G-37 may seek ways around the rule through payments to and contributions by affiliated PACs that benefit issuer officials. When evaluating whether contributions made by affiliated PACs may be subject to the provisions of Rule G-37, the MSRB emphasizes that dealers should first determine whether such affiliated PAC would be viewed as a dealer-controlled PAC. If an affiliated PAC is determined to be a dealer-controlled PAC, then its contributions to issuer officials would subject the dealer to the ban on municipal securities business and its contributions to issuer officials, state or local political parties, and bond ballot campaigns would be subject to disclosure under Rule G-37. Even if the affiliated PAC is determined not to be a dealer-controlled PAC, the dealer still must consider whether payments made by the dealer or its MFPs to such affiliated PAC could ultimately be viewed as an indirect contribution under Rule G-37(d) if, for example, the affiliated PAC is being used as a conduit for making a contribution to an issuer official.

The MSRB wishes to provide guidance regarding the factors that may result in an affiliated PAC being viewed as controlled by the dealer or an MFP of the dealer and thereby being treated as a dealer-controlled PAC for purposes of Rule G-37. The MSRB also wishes to ensure that the industry is cognizant of prior MSRB guidance regarding the potential for payments to and contributions by affiliated PACs to constitute indirect contributions under the rule.

Indicators of Control by Dealers and MFPs

Soon after adoption of Rule G-37, the MSRB stated that each dealer must determine whether a PAC is dealer controlled, with any PAC of a non-bank dealer assumed to be a dealer-controlled PAC.[4]  The MSRB has also stated that the determination of whether a PAC of a bank dealer[5] is a dealer-controlled PAC would depend upon whether the bank dealer or anyone from the bank dealer department has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC.[6]  Such ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of a PAC also would be indicative of control of such PAC by a non-bank dealer or any of its MFPs, although it would not be the exclusive indicator of such control. While this guidance establishes basic principles with regard to making a determination of control, it does not set out an exhaustive list of circumstances under which a PAC may or may not be viewed as dealer or MFP controlled.  The specific facts and circumstances regarding the creation, management, operation and control of a particular PAC must be considered in making a determination of control with respect to such PAC.

Creation of PAC. In general, a dealer or MFP involved in the creation of a PAC would continue to be viewed as controlling such PAC unless and until such dealer or MFP becomes wholly disassociated in any direct or indirect manner with the PAC. Thus, any PAC created by a dealer, acting either in a sole capacity or together with other entities or individuals, would be presumed to be a dealer-controlled PAC.  This presumption continues at least as long as the dealer or any MFP of the dealer retains any formal or informal role in connection with such PAC, regardless of whether such dealer or MFP has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. This presumption also would continue for so long as any associated person of the dealer (either an individual, whether or not an MFP, or an affiliated company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with the dealer) has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. In effect, a dealer could not attempt to treat a PAC it created and then spun off to the control of an affiliated company as not being a dealer-controlled PAC. However, depending on the totality of the facts and circumstances, a PAC originally created by a dealer in which the dealer or its MFPs no longer retain any role, and with respect to which any other affiliates retain only very limited non-control roles, could be viewed as no longer controlled by the dealer.

Similarly, a PAC created by any person associated with the dealer at the time the PAC was created, acting either in a sole capacity or together with other entities or individuals, would be presumed to be controlled by such person.  Such presumption continues at least for so long as such person retains any formal or informal role in connection with such PAC, regardless of whether any such person has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC.  This presumption also would continue for so long as any other person associated with the same dealer as the creator of the PAC has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. Although such PAC may not be viewed as being subject to Rule G-37 as an MFP-controlled PAC when originally created if such person was not then an MFP, if the person creating the PAC, or any other associated person with the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of such PAC, is or later becomes an MFP, such PAC would be deemed an MFP-controlled PAC.[7]

Management, Funding and Control of PAC. Beyond the role of the dealer, MFP or other person in creating a PAC and maintaining an ongoing association with such PAC, the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of a PAC is also important. Strong indicators of management and control are not mitigated by the fact that such dealer, MFP or other person does not have exclusive, predominant or “majority” control of the PAC, its management, its policies, or its decisions with regard to making contributions.  For example, the fact that a dealer or MFP may only have a single vote on a governing board or other decision-making or advisory board or committee of a PAC, and therefore does not have sole power to cause the PAC to take any action, would not obviate the status of such dealer or MFP as having control of the PAC, so long as the dealer or MFP has the ability, alone or in conjunction with other similarly empowered entities or individuals, to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC.  In essence, it is possible for a single PAC to be viewed as controlled by multiple different dealers if the control of such PAC is shared among such dealers, although the presumption of control may be rebutted as described below.

The level of funding provided by dealers and their MFPs to a PAC may also be indicative of control. A PAC that receives a majority of its funding from a single dealer (including the collective contributions of its MFPs and employees) or a single MFP is conclusively presumed to be controlled by such dealer or MFP, regardless of the lack of any of the other indicia of control described in this notice.  Another important factor is the size or frequency of contributions by a dealer or MFP,[8] viewed in light of the size and frequency of contributions made by other contributors not affiliated in any way with such dealer or MFP. For example, a limited number of small contributions freely made by employees of a dealer to an affiliated PAC (i.e., not directed by the dealer and not part of an automated or otherwise dealer-organized program of contributions) would not, by itself, automatically raise a presumption of dealer control so long as the collective contributions by the dealer or its employees is not significant as compared to the total funding of the affiliated PAC, subject to consideration of the other relevant facts and circumstances. In addition, contributions made by a dealer or MFP to an affiliated PAC could raise a stronger inference of de facto dealer or MFP control than when such contributions were made to non-affiliated PACs.

However, even where a dealer or MFP is not viewed as controlling a PAC under the principles described above, dealers should remain mindful of the potential for leveraging the contribution activities of affiliated PACs in soliciting municipal securities business in a way that could raise a presumption of dealer or MFP control.  For example, an MFP’s references to the contributions made by an affiliated PAC during solicitations of municipal securities business could, depending on the facts and circumstances, serve as evidence of coordination of such PAC’s activities with the dealer or MFP that could, together with other facts, be indicative of direct or indirect control of the PAC by such dealer or MFP.  Such control could be found even in circumstances where the dealer or its MFPs have not made contributions to the affiliated PAC.[9]

Of course, the presumptions described above may be rebutted, depending upon the totality of facts and circumstances. Considerations that may serve to rebut such presumptions may include whether the dealer or person creating the PAC:  (i) participates with a broad-based group of other entities and/or individuals in creating the PAC, (ii) at no time undertakes any direct or indirect role (and, in the case of a dealer, no person associated with the dealer undertakes any direct or indirect role) in leading the creation of the PAC or in directing or causing the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC, and/or (iii) provides funding for such PAC (and, in the case of a dealer, its associated persons collectively provide funding for such PAC) that is not substantially greater than the typical funding levels of other participants in the PAC who do not undertake a direct or indirect role in leading the creation of the PAC or in directing or causing the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC.

Indirect Contributions Through Bank PACs or Other Affiliated PACs

As noted above, if an affiliated PAC is determined not to be a dealer-controlled PAC, a dealer must still consider whether payments made by the dealer or its MFPs to such affiliated PAC could be viewed as an indirect contribution that would become subject to Rule G-37 pursuant to section (d) thereof. The MSRB has provided extensive guidance on such indirect contributions, noting in 1996 that, depending on the facts and circumstances, contributions to a non-dealer associated PAC that is soliciting funds for the purpose of supporting a limited number of issuer officials might result in the same prohibition on municipal securities business as would contributions made directly to the issuer official.[10]  The MSRB also noted that dealers should make inquiries of a non-dealer associated PAC that is soliciting contributions in order to ensure that contributions to such a PAC would not be treated as an indirect contribution.[11]

The MSRB also has previously provided guidance in 2005 with regard to supervisory procedures [12] that dealers should have in place in connection with payments to a non-dealer associated PAC or a political party to avoid indirect rule violations of Rule G-37(d).  In such guidance, the MSRB stated that, in order to ensure compliance with Rule G-27(c) as it relates to payments to political parties or PACs and Rule G-37(d), each dealer must adopt, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that neither the dealer nor its MFPs are using payments to political parties or non-dealer controlled PACs to contribute indirectly to an official of an issuer.[13]  Among other things, dealers might seek to establish procedures requiring that, prior to the making of any contribution to a PAC, the dealer undertake certain due diligence inquiries regarding the intended use of such contributions, the motive for making the contribution and whether the contribution was solicited. Further, in order to ensure compliance with Rule G-37(d), dealers could consider establishing certain information barriers between any affiliated PACs and the dealer and its MFPs.[14]  Dealers that have established such information barriers should review their adequacy to ensure that the affiliated entities’ contributions, payments or PAC disbursement decisions are neither influenced by the dealer or its MFPs, nor communicated to the dealers and the MFPs.

The MSRB subsequently noted that the 2005 guidance did not establish an obligation to put in place the specific procedures and information barriers described in the guidance so long as the dealer in fact has and enforces other written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the conduct of the dealer and its MFPs are in compliance with Rule G-37(d).[15]  Thus, for example, when information regarding past or planned contributions of an affiliated PAC is or may be available to or known by the dealer or its MFPs, the dealer might establish and enforce written supervisory procedures that prohibit the dealer or MFP from providing information to issuer personnel regarding past or anticipated affiliated PAC contributions.

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[1] Rule G-37 defines municipal securities business as: (i) the purchase of a primary offering of municipal securities from an issuer on other than a competitive bid basis; (ii) the offer or sale of a primary offering of municipal securities on behalf of an issuer; (iii) the provision of financial advisory or consultant services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a primary offering of municipal securities in which the dealer was chosen to provide such services on other than a competitive bid basis; or (iv) the provision of remarketing agent services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a primary offering of municipal securities in which the dealer was chosen to provide such services on other than a competitive bid basis.

[2] The MSRB has previously stated that the matter of control depends upon whether or not the dealer or the MFP has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC (MSRB Question & Answer No. IV. 24 – Dealer Controlled PAC).

[3] Rule G-37(d) provides that no broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer or any municipal finance professional shall, directly or indirectly, through or by any other person or means, do any act which would result in a violation of sections (b) or (c) of the rule. Section (b) relates to the ban on business and Section (c) relates to the prohibition on soliciting and coordinating contributions.

[4] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. IV.24 (May 24, 1994).

[5] MSRB Rule D-8 defines a bank dealer as a municipal securities dealer which is a bank or a separately identifiable department or division of a bank.

[6] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. IV.24 (May 24, 1994).

[7] However, a PAC created by an individual acting in his or her formal capacity as an officer, employee, director or other representative of a dealer, regardless of whether such individual is an MFP, would be deemed a dealer-controlled PAC rather than a PAC controlled by the individual.

[8] A dealer or an MFP may make sufficiently large or frequent contributions to a PAC so as to obtain effective control over the PAC, depending on the totality of facts and circumstances.

[9] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. III.7 (September 22, 2005) for a discussion of potential indirect contributions through affiliated PACs.

[10] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. III.4 (August 6, 1996).

[11] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. III.5 (August 6, 1996).

[12] Rule G-27, on supervision, provides in section (c) that each dealer shall adopt, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the conduct of the municipal securities activities of the dealer and its associated persons are in compliance with MSRB rules.

[13] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. III.7 (September 22, 2005).

[14] The potential information barriers described in the guidance include: i) a prohibition on the dealer or MFP from recommending, nominating, appointing or approving the management of affiliated PACs; ii) a prohibition on sharing the affiliated PAC’s meeting agenda, meeting schedule, or meeting minutes; iii) a prohibition on identification of prior affiliated PAC contributions, planned PAC contributions or anticipated PAC contributions; iv) a prohibition on directly providing or coordinating information about prior negotiated municipal securities businesses, solicited municipal securities business, and planned solicitations of municipal securities business; and v) other such information barriers as the firms deems appropriate to monitor conflicting interest and prevent abuses effectively.

[15] See Rule G-37 Interpretive Letter – Supervisory procedures relating to indirect contributions; conference accounts and 527 organizations (December 21, 2006).

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 added a provision to the Internal Revenue Code that authorizes state and local governments to issue two types of “Build America Bonds” as taxable governmental bonds with Federal subsidies for a portion of their borrowing costs.

The first type of Build America Bond provides a Federal subsidy through Federal tax credits to investors in the bonds.  The tax credits may also be “stripped” and sold to other investors, pursuant to regulations to be issued by the Treasury Department.  In its Notice 2009-26, the Treasury Department refers to this type of Build America Bond as “Build America Bonds (Tax Credit).”

The second type of Build America Bond provides a Federal subsidy through a refundable tax credit paid to state or local governmental issuers by the Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service.  The Treasury Department refers to this type of Build America Bond as “Build America Bonds (Direct Payment).”  This Notice refers to both Build America Bonds (Tax Credit) and Build America Bonds (Direct Payment) as “Build America Bonds.”

Some municipal market participants have requested guidance on whether Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board rules are applicable to Build America Bonds.  Build America Bonds are municipal securities, because they are issued by States and their political subdivisions and instrumentalities.  Accordingly, all of the MSRB’s rules apply to transactions effected by brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) in Build America Bonds, including rules regarding uniform and fair practice, political contributions, automated clearance and settlement, the payment of MSRB underwriting and transaction assessment fees, and the professional qualifications of registered representatives and principals.

For example, dealers in the primary market should note that current Rule G-36 requires underwriters to submit official statements to the MSRB, accompanied by completed Form G-36 (OS), for most primary offerings of municipal securities.  Dealers also have official statement delivery responsibilities to customers under Rule G-32.  Once final, recently proposed revisions to Rule G-32 will require underwriters to satisfy their official statement submission obligations electronically through use of the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access system (“EMMA”) and will allow dealers to satisfy their official statement delivery obligations by means of appropriate notice to customers.

The MSRB understands that many Build America Bonds may be sold by dealers’ taxable desks and reminds dealers that Rule G-27 requires that municipal securities principals must supervise all municipal securities activities, including such sales.

Dealers in the secondary market should note that Rule G-14 requires that all transactions in municipal securities must be reported to the MSRB within certain prescribed time periods. 

The following additional types of tax credit bonds are also municipal securities subject to MSRB rules: Recovery Zone Economic Development Bonds, Qualified School Construction Bonds, Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, New Clean Renewable Energy Bonds, Midwestern Tax Credit Bonds, Energy Conservation Bonds, and Qualified Zone Academy Bonds.

As a result of the unprecedented number of “failed  auctions” [1] in municipal Auction Rate Securities (“ARS”) that have occurred this year, many dealers have announced plans to offer to purchase customer positions in municipal ARS at a stated price, typically par (“ARS Buybacks”). These ARS Buyback programs predominantly have occurred pursuant to settlement agreements with state attorneys general. The MSRB has received questions from dealers whether ARS Buybacks must be reported to the MSRB Real-Time Transaction Reporting System (RTRS) and, if so, whether the M9c0 “away from market - other reason” special condition indicator must be included on such trade reports.

MSRB Rule G-14, on transaction reporting, requires all purchase-sale transactions in municipal securities to be reported to RTRS. Transactions in ARS must be reported to RTRS and trade reports of ARS Buybacks must be reported to RTRS without the M9c0 special condition indicator. The primary reason a trade report would be required to include the M9c0 special condition indicator is that the trade report contains information that could be misleading to users of price transparency reports.[2] The MSRB does not believe that trade reports of ARS Buybacks would provide misleading information relating to the market value of ARS because the price at which ARS Buybacks are executed has been publicly announced. Therefore, trade reports of ARS Buybacks as well as of other purchases of ARS from holders at current market prices must be reported without the M9c0 special condition indicator.[3]

[1] A “failed auction” is not an event of default by the issuer, it only relates to the auction process not being able to determine a clearing rate and not permitting investors attempting to sell their securities from being able to do so.

[2] RTRS serves the dual purposes of price transparency and market surveillance. Transactions reported with the M9c0 special condition indicator are entered into the surveillance database but suppressed from price dissemination. The MSRB has identified three specific situations in which the M9c0 special condition indicator is required to be included on trade reports. See Notice of Interpretation of Rule G-14: “Reporting of Transactions in Certain Special Trading Situations: Rule G-14,” dated January 2, 2008.

[3] Users of the MSRB’s price transparency reports produced from RTRS should be aware that ARS Buybacks may result in a higher than normal volume of trade reports in ARS and should not use this volume as an indication that the market for ARS has fully recovered from the unprecedented number of failed auctions that have occurred in 2008. Further, the prices at which ARS Buybacks are executed may not reflect the actual market value for the security.

The MSRB Real-Time Transaction Reporting System (RTRS) serves the dual purposes of price transparency and market surveillance.  Because a comprehensive database of transactions is needed for the surveillance function of RTRS, MSRB Rule G-14, on transaction reporting, with limited exceptions, requires dealers to report all of their purchase-sale transactions to RTRS within fifteen minutes.  All reported transactions are entered into the RTRS surveillance database used by market regulators and enforcement agencies. However, the special nature of some transactions effects their value for price transparency and the ability of dealers to meet the fifteen minute reporting deadline. To address these issues, RTRS was designed so that a dealer can code a specific transaction report with a “special condition indicator” to designate the transaction as being subject to a special condition.[1]

TRANSACTIONS EXECUTED WITH SPECIAL PRICING CONDITIONS

Three trading scenarios recently have generated questions from dealers and users of the MSRB price transparency products.  Each of the three trading scenarios described below represents situations where the transaction executed is not a typical arms-length transaction negotiated in the secondary market and thus may be a misleading indicator of the market value of a security.  To clarify transaction reporting requirements and to prevent publication of a potentially misleading price, dealers are required to report these transactions with the M9c0 special condition indicator.[2] Transactions reported with this special condition indicator are entered into the surveillance database but suppressed from price dissemination to ensure that transparency products do not include prices that might be confusing or misleading.

Customer Repurchase Agreement Transactions

Some dealers have programs allowing customers to finance municipal securities positions with repurchase agreements (“repos”). Typically, a bona fide repo consists of two transactions whereby a dealer will sell securities to a customer and agree to repurchase the securities on a future date at a pre-determined price that will produce an agreed-upon rate of return. Both the sale and purchase transactions resulting from a customer repo do not represent typical arms-length transactions negotiated in the secondary market and are therefore required to be reported with the M9c0 special condition indicator.

UIT-Related Transactions

Dealers sponsoring Unit Investment Trusts (“UIT”) or similar programs sometimes purchase securities through several transactions and deposit such securities into an “accumulation” account. After the accumulation account contains the necessary securities for the UIT, the dealer transfers the securities from the accumulation account into the UIT. Purchases of securities for an accumulation account are presumably done at market value and are required to be reported normally. The transfer of securities out of the accumulation account and into the UIT, however, does not represent a typical arms-length transaction negotiated in the secondary market. Dealers are required to report the subsequent transfer of securities from the accumulation account to the UIT with the M9c0 special condition indicator.

TOB Program-Related Transactions

Dealers sponsoring tender option bond programs (“TOB Programs”) for customers sometimes transfer securities previously sold to a customer into a derivative trust from which derivative products are created. If the customer sells the securities held in the derivative trust, the trust is liquidated and the securities are reconstituted from the derivative products and transferred back to the customer. The transfer of securities into the derivative trust and the transfer of securities back to the customer upon liquidation of the trust do not represent typical arms-length transactions negotiated in the secondary market. Such transactions are required to be reported using the M9c0 special condition indicator.[3]

INTER-DEALER TRANSACTIONS REPORTED “LATE”

Inter-dealer transaction reporting is accomplished by both the purchasing and selling dealers submitting the trade to the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation’s (DTCC) automated comparison system (RTTM) following DTCC’s procedures. RTTM forwards information about the transaction to RTRS.  The inter-dealer trade processing situations described below are the subject of dealer questions and currently result in dealers being charged with “late” reporting or reporting of a trade date and time that differs from the date and time of trade execution.  To allow dealers to report these types of transactions without receiving a late error and to allow enforcement agencies to identify these trades as reported under special circumstances, the MSRB has added two new special condition indicators.[4] New special condition indicator Mc40 is used to identify certain inter-dealer transactions that are ineligible for comparison on trade date, and new special condition indicator Mc50 is used to identify resubmissions of certain uncompared inter-dealer transactions that have been cancelled by RTTM. Described below are the procedures for reporting transactions arising in three inter-dealer transaction reporting scenarios using the new special condition indicators.

Inter-Dealer Ineligible on Trade Date

Certain inter-dealer transactions are not able to be submitted to RTTM on trade date or with the accurate trade date either because all information necessary for comparison is not available or because the trade date is not a “valid” trade date in RTTM. The two inter-dealer trading scenarios described below are required to be reported using the new Mc40 special condition indicator.

VRDO Ineligible on Trade Date

On occasion, inter-dealer secondary market transactions are effected in variable rate demand obligations (VRDOs) in which the interest rate reset date occurs between trade date and the time of settlement. Since dealers in this scenario cannot calculate accrued interest or final money on trade date, they cannot process the trade through RTTM until the interest rate reset has occurred. To report such transactions, both dealers that are party to the transaction are required to report the transaction by the end of the day that the interest rate reset occurs, including the trade date and time that the original trade was executed. Both dealers are required to include the new Mc40 special condition indicator that causes RTRS not to score either dealer late. Transactions reported using this procedure are disseminated without a special condition indicator and the trade reports reflect the original trade date and time.

Invalid RTTM Trade Dates

Dealers sometimes execute inter-dealer transactions on weekends and on certain holidays that are not valid RTTM trade dates. Such trades cannot be reported to RTRS using the actual trade date if they occur on a weekend or holiday. To accomplish automated comparison and transaction reporting of such transactions, dealers are required to submit these inter-dealer transactions to RTTM no later than fifteen minutes after the start of the next RTRS Business Day and to include a trade date and time that represents the next earliest “valid” values that can be submitted.[5] Dealers also are required to include the new Mc40 special condition indicator that allows RTRS to identify these transactions so that enforcement agencies can be alerted to the fact that the trade reports were made under special circumstances using a special trade date and time. RTRS disseminates these trade reports without a special condition indicator and the trade report includes the trade date and time reflecting the next earliest “valid” values that can be submitted.[6]

Resubmission of an RTTM Cancel

A dealer may submit an inter-dealer trade to RTTM and find that the contra-party fails to report its side of the trade.  Such “uncompared” trades are not disseminated by RTRS on price transparency products.  After two days, RTTM removes the uncompared trade report from its system and the dealer originally submitting the trade must resubmit the transaction in a second attempt to obtain a comparison with its contra-party, which currently results in RTRS scoring the resubmitted trade report “late.”

The dealer that originally submitted information to RTTM is required to resubmit identical information about the transaction in the second attempt to compare and report the trade by the end of the day after RTTM cancels the trade. The resubmitting dealer also is required to include the new Mc50 special condition indicator that causes RTRS to not score the resubmitting dealer late. The indicator may only be used by a dealer resubmitting the exact same trade information for the same trade.[7] For example, the contra-party that failed to submit its side to the trade accurately, thus preventing comparison of the transaction, is not allowed to use the indicator. RTRS disseminates trade reports made under this procedure without a special condition indicator once RTTM compares the trade and the trade report reflects the original trade date and time.

[1] See Specifications for Real-Time Reporting of Municipal Securities Transactions Section 4.3.2.

[2] In addition to the special trading situations identified in this notice, the M9c0 special condition indicator, “away from market – other reason,” is required to be included on a trade report if the transaction price differs substantially from the market price for multiple reasons or for a reason not covered by another special condition indicator.

[3] In some cases, the transfer of securities into the derivative trust and the transfer of securities back to the customer upon liquidation of the trust do not represent purchase-sale transactions due to the terms of the trust agreement.  MSRB rules on transaction reporting do not require a dealer to report a transfer of securities to RTRS that is not a purchase-sale transaction in municipal securities.

[4] See MSRB Notice 2007-25 (August 13, 2007).

[5] The MSRB previously provided an example of a trade date and time that would be included on a trade report using this procedure.  See “Reporting of Inter-Dealer Transactions That Occur Outside of RTRS Business Day Hours or on Invalid RTTM Trade Dates,” MSRB Notice 2007-12 (March 23, 2007).

[6] Using this procedure will result in transactions reported with a trade date and time that differs from what is recorded in a dealer’s books and records.  Dealers are reminded that books and records are required to reflect the date and time of trade execution.

[7] The resubmitting dealer would not be required to resubmit the same reference number or preparation time on the resubmitted transaction; however, other information about the transaction, such as price, quantity, trade date and time, would be required to be identical to information included in the original trade submission.