Issuer consent: financial advisor participation in underwriting. This responds to your letter of March 6, 1984, regarding the application of rule G-23, concerning the activities of financial advisors to the following activities of [name deleted] (the "Company").

Your letter states that the Company serves as a financial advisor to a number of municipal entities with respect to the issuance and delivery of bonds. In the majority of circumstances in which bonds are to be marketed through a competitive bidding process, the Company is requested by the issuer either to bid for the bonds independently for its own account or as a participant with others in a syndicate organized to submit a bid. You state that the Company’s customary financial advisory contract, in almost all instances, specifically reserves to the Company the right to bid independently or in a syndicate with others for any bonds marketed through a competitive bid.

However, to further accommodate these circumstances, you state that it is the Company’s practice to include in the official statement on any bond issue subject to competitive bids specific language, such as:

The Company is employed as Financial Advisor to the City in connection with the issuance of the Bonds. The Financial Advisor’s fee for services rendered with respect to the sale of the Bond is contingent upon the issuance and delivery of the Bonds. The Company may submit a bid for the Bonds, either independently or as a member of a syndicate organized to submit a bid for the Bonds.

In the notice of sale, the following language is included:

The Company, the City’s Financial Advisor, reserves the right to bid on the Bonds.

You add that these two documents, the official statement and the notice of sale, must be approved by formal resolution of the governing authority of the issuer, such as a city council or a board of directors, before bids are requested or on the date of sale. You ask whether the above language printed in the official statement and the notice of sale, which is approved by formal resolution of the governing authority of the issuer, constitutes compliance with rule G-23(d)(ii).

Rule G-23, concerning the activities of financial advisors, is designed to minimize the prima facie conflict of interest that exists when a municipal securities professional acts as both financial advisor and underwriter with respect to the same issue. Specifically, rule G-23(d)(ii) provides that a municipal securities dealer which is acting as a financial advisor may not acquire or participate in the distribution of a new issue unless,

if such issue is to be sold by the issuer at competitive bid, the issuer has expressly consented in writing prior to the bid to such acquisition or participation.

Compliance with the rule’s requirement that an issuer expressly consent in writing to the financial advisor’s participation in the underwriting cannot be inferred from its approval of the official statement and notice of sale. These documents are designed primarily to describe the new issue and a passing reference to the advisor’s possible participation in the underwriting of the bond issue cannot be construed as express approval of such activity since it is not clear that the issuer is provided with a sufficient opportunity to determine whether it is in its best interests to allow its financial advisor to participate in the competitive bidding.

While the Board does not mandate the form of the issuer’s consent, it understands that financial advisory contracts often may include consent language applicable to a specific new issue. Alternatively, financial advisors may obtain the consent of an issuer by means of a separate document. However, a financial advisory contract that reserves to the financial advisor the right to bid for any of the issuer’s bonds marketed through a competitive bid does not satisfy the requirements of rule G-23(d)(ii). The Board has stated that such "blanket consents" do not afford an issuer a sufficient opportunity to consider whether, under the particular circumstances of an offering, the financial advisor’s potential conflict of interest is sufficient to warrant not consenting to the financial advisor’s participation in the sale. MSRB interpretation of April 10, 1984.