Overview

MSRB Rule G-47, on time of trade disclosure, requires brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (collectively, “dealers”) to disclose to their customers, at or prior to the time of trade, all material information known about the transaction, as well as material information about the municipal security that is reasonably accessible to the market. The MSRB has previously provided interpretive guidance, now codified in supplementary material to Rule G-47, on specific types of information that is material where specific scenarios occur and requires time of trade disclosure. Rule G-47, however, emphasizes that this list of specific disclosures is not exhaustive, and that other information may be material to a customer and required to be disclosed. The MSRB is publishing this notice to state its interpretation that the fact that a municipal security bears market discount is material information that must be disclosed to a customer under Rule G-47.

Market Discount

When a municipal security is acquired in the secondary market for less than par value, the security may have “market discount.” The amount of market discount is equal to the excess, if any, of the stated redemption price at maturity over the basis of the security immediately after its purchase by the investor. Market discount occurs when the value of a municipal security declines after its issue date—which often may occur due to a rise in interest rates. The fact that a municipal security bears market discount may significantly affect its tax treatment. Under federal tax law, for bonds purchased after April 30, 1993, the market discount is taxed at the investor’s ordinary income tax rate, rather than the capital gains rate.[1]

Original Issue Discount Bonds. Market discount is calculated differently for original issue discount (OID) bonds. An OID bond is a bond that was sold at the time of issue at a price that included an original issue discount. The original issue discount is the amount by which the bond’s stated redemption price at maturity exceeded its public offering price at the time of its original issuance and, for a tax-exempt municipal security, is generally treated as tax-exempt interest.[2]

Market discount exists for an OID bond when the bond is acquired in the secondary market for less than its revised or adjusted issue price. The revised or adjusted issue price for an OID bond is equal to the bond’s original issue price plus the accrued OID up to the date of purchase. The amount of market discount is equal to the excess, if any, of the revised issue price over the basis of the bond immediately after its purchase by the investor.

De Minimis Rule. Bonds with a de minimis amount of market discount are subject to more favorable tax treatment than bonds with a non-de minimis amount of market discount. Under the de minimis rule, if the amount of market discount is less than one-fourth of 1% (.0025) of the stated redemption price of the bond multiplied by the number of complete years from the date of purchase to the date of maturity, the market discount is de minimis and is generally taxed as a capital gain, rather than ordinary income.

Market Discount Disclosure at or Prior to the Time of Trade

As noted, Rule G-47 requires dealers to disclose to their customers, at or prior to the time of trade, “all material information known about the transaction, as well as material information about the security that is reasonably accessible to the market.”[3] This disclosure obligation applies whether the transaction is unsolicited or recommended, and whether it is a primary offering or secondary market transaction. Information is considered to be material under Rule G-47 if there is a substantial likelihood that the information would be considered important or significant by a reasonable investor in making an investment decision. The MSRB has previously stated, and codified as supplementary material to Rule G-47, that the fact that a municipal security bears an original issue discount is material information that dealers are obligated to disclose, because it may affect the tax treatment of the security.[4] Significantly, in explaining this interpretation of the Board’s rules, the MSRB noted that appropriate disclosure of a security’s original issue discount feature should assist customers in computing the market discount or premium on their transaction. The MSRB also noted its concern that, absent adequate disclosure of a security’s original issue discount status, an investor might not be aware that all or a portion of his or her investment return represented by accretion of the discount is tax-exempt, and might therefore, for example, sell the security at an inappropriately low price (i.e., a price not reflecting the tax-exempt portion of the discount). 

Similarly, the MSRB is concerned that, absent adequate disclosure that a security has market discount, an investor might not be aware that all or a portion of his or her investment return represented by accretion of the market discount is taxable as ordinary income, and therefore might, for example, purchase the securities at an inappropriately high price (i.e., a price not reflecting the potentially higher tax rate applicable to the discount). The existence of market discount may impact an investor’s decision to purchase or sell an affected bond or determination of what price to pay or accept for such bond. As a result, the MSRB believes that the fact that a security has market discount is material information that is required to be disclosed to a customer under Rule G-47 at or prior to the time of trade.

Q: Dealers are required to include time of trade (along with trade date) on all transaction reports. What is “time of  trade?”

A: Transaction reporting procedures define “time of trade” as the time at which a contract is formed for a sale or purchase of municipal securities at a set quantity and set price.[1] For transaction reporting purposes, this is considered to be the same as the time that a trade is “executed.” The time that the trade is executed is not necessarily the time that the trade information is entered into the dealer’s processing system. For example, if a trade is executed on a trading desk but not entered for processing until later, the time of execution (not the time of entering the record into the processing system) is required to be reported as the “time of trade.” Similarly, when a dealer executes a transaction outside of the RTRS Business Day,[2] the time the trade was executed (rather than the time that the trade report is made) is the “time of trade” required to be reported.

2. Q: What is “time of trade” for new issue securities?

A: For new issue securities, a transaction effected on a “when, as and if issued”[3] basis cannot be executed, confirmed and reported until the municipal security has been formally awarded by the issuer. For a negotiated issue, this “time of formal award” is defined as the time of the signing of the bond purchase agreement and for a competitive issue, it is the time of the official award by the issuer. While dealers may take orders for securities and make conditional trading commitments prior to the award, dealers cannot execute transactions, send confirmations or make a trade report prior to the time of formal award. Once a new issue of municipal securities has been formally awarded, trade executions can begin. The time of execution is then reported to the MSRB.[4]

3. Q: There is a non-transaction-based compensation special condition indicator (NTBC indicator) for customer transactions. Is the NTBC indicator to be used only on customer transactions executed in a wrap fee account?

A: No, while transactions that occur in a wrap fee account may be one example of a transaction that qualifies as a customer transaction with no transaction-based dealer compensation component, the NTBC indicator is intended to distinguish all customer transactions that do not include a transaction-based compensation component from those transactions that do include a mark-up, mark-down or commission. Dealers should carefully consider other transactions that may require this indicator, such as those in which the dealer receives a remarketing fee, or a transaction often referred to as an “accommodation” that does not include a transaction-based dealer compensation component.

4. Q: Is the NTBC indicator to be used only on customer trades executed on a principal basis?

A: No. The NTBC indicator applies to both principal and agency trades. It is important for dealers to affirmatively indicate the transactions where a principal transaction does not include a mark-up or mark-down and an agency trade does not include a commission.

5. Q: Is the NTBC indicator to be used only on retail customer accounts?

A: No. There is no exemption for transactions with Sophisticated Municipal Market Professionals (SMMPs). The NTBC indicator is determined on a transaction basis and is to be used on any customer transaction to which it applies.

6. Q: What is the purpose of identifying an inter-dealer trade executed with or using the services of an alternative trading system (ATS)?

A: The purpose of the indicator is to better ascertain the ex- tent to which ATSs are used in the municipal market and to indicate to market participants information that the services of an ATS were used in executing the inter-dealer transaction.

7. Q: If a counterparty does not use the ATS indicator, will the two dealers’ transaction submission still match on the NSCC Real-Time Trade Matching (RTTM)?

A: Yes. The ATS indicator is not a matching value for RTTM. As noted in the MSRB’s Specifications for Real-Time Reporting of Municipal Securities Transactions, a new error code (Q55A) will be noted when the seller’s and buyer’s trade reports differ with respect to the ATS special condition indicator. Incorrect submissions should be modified as necessary.

8. Q: Do transactions executed over the phone with an ATS (voice trades) require a special condition indicator?

A: As noted in MSRB Notice 2015-07, an inter-dealer trans- action executed with or using the services of an alternative trading system with Form ATS on file with the SEC is required to be reported with the ATS indicator regardless of the mode of the transaction. See the MSRB’s Specifications for Real-Time Reporting of Municipal Securities Transactions for more detail on the use of the ATS special condition indicator.

9. Q: As of July 18, 2016, dealers are no longer required to report yield on customer trade reports, but MSRB Rule G-15 still obligates a dealer to calculate yield for customer confirmations. If a dealer’s yield calculation used for customer confirmations to comply with Rule G-15 differs from the yield disseminated by the MSRB, how can the dealer determine the reason for the difference?

A: The EMMA website includes a column labeled “Calculation Date & Price (%)” that displays the date and price for which the yield was calculated, which provides transparency on the inputs used in MSRB yield calculations to explain any potential calculation differences.

[1] See MSRB Rule G-14 RTRS Procedures (d)(iii).

[2] Transactions effected during the RTRS Business Day (from 7:30 a.m. to 6:30 p.m. Eastern time) are required to be reported in real-time. Transactions effected outside of those hours are required to be reported within 15 minutes after the start of the next RTRS Business Day.

[3] See MSRB Glossary of Municipal Securities Terms, Third Edition, August 2013.

[4] For additional discussion of time of trade on transactions in new issue securities, see “Notice Requesting Comment on Draft Amendments to Rule G-34 to Facilitate Real-Time Transaction Reporting and Explaining Time of Trade for Reporting New Issue Trades,” MSRB Notice 2004-18 (June 18, 2004) and “Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Changes to Extend the Expiration of the Three-Hour Exception and to Require Underwriter Participation with DTCC’s NIIDS System,” MSRB Notice 2007-36 (November 27, 2007) .

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “Board”) has learned that sales of certain interests in accounts held by states, or agencies or instrumentalities thereof (the “state”), may be effected through brokers, dealers or municipal securities dealers (collectively, “dealers”). The Board understands that such accounts may be established by states to implement qualified ABLE programs under Section 529A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.[1] In response to a request of the Board, staff of the Office of Municipal Securities at the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has stated that “at least some interests in ABLE accounts . . . may be ‘municipal securities’ as defined in Section 3(a)(29) of the [Securities] Exchange Act [of 1934], depending on the facts and circumstances, including without limitation, the extent to which an ABLE account offered through an ABLE Program is a direct obligation of, or obligation guaranteed as to principal or interest by, a State or any agency or instrumentality thereof.”[2]

Any such interest may, in fact, constitute interests in municipal fund securities, as defined by MSRB Rule D-12. To the extent that dealers effect transactions in municipal fund securities, such transactions are subject to the jurisdiction of the Board pursuant to Section 15B of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”).[3]

With respect to the applicability to municipal fund securities of Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12,[4] relating to municipal securities disclosure, staff of the Office of Municipal Securities has stated:

[W]e note that Rule 15c2-12(f)(7) under the Exchange Act defines a “primary offering” as including an offering of municipal securities directly or indirectly by or on behalf of an issuer of such securities.  Based upon your letter and communications with MSRB staff, it is our understanding that interests in ABLE Programs generally are offered only by direct purchase from the issuer.  Accordingly, we would view those interests as having been sold in a “primary offering” as that term is defined in Rule 15c2-12.  If a dealer is acting as an “underwriter” (as defined in Rule 15c2-12(f)(8)) in connection with that primary offering, the dealer may be subject to the requirements of Rule 15c2-12.[5]

Consistent with the SEC staff’s views, dealers effecting transactions in ABLE programs may be subject to all MSRB rules, unless such dealers are specifically exempted from any of those rules, because those dealers would be effecting transactions in municipal fund securities. In particular, dealers acting as underwriters with respect to the sale of interests in ABLE programs may be subject to the requirements of (i) MSRB Rule G-32, on disclosures in connection with primary offerings, and the requirement to submit official statements through the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA®) system[6] pursuant to Rule G-32(b) and (ii) MSRB Rule G-45, on reporting of information on municipal fund securities, and the requirement to submit information on Form G-45 pursuant to Rule G-45(a).

Further, in 1999, the SEC staff provided guidance to the Board that (i) interests in higher education trusts established by states (“529 college savings plans”) may be municipal securities, depending on the facts and circumstances, under the Exchange Act and (ii) such interests appear to have been sold in a “primary offering” as defined under Rule 15c2-12 pursuant to the Exchange Act so that a dealer acting as an underwriter (defined in Rule 15c2-12(f)(8)) in connection with that primary offering may be subject to the requirements of Rule 15c2-12.[7] In addition, the SEC determined that interests offered by such 529 college savings plans are municipal securities under Section 3(a)(29) of the Exchange Act.[8] In response to the SEC staff’s guidance and the SEC’s determination, the Board published interpretive guidance relating to the sale of interests in 529 college savings plans by dealers.  All interpretive guidance under MSRB rules applicable to the sale of interests in 529 college savings plans also would apply to the sale of interests in ABLE programs, as relevant. 

The Board anticipates that it will publish guidance to address particular issues, including Rule G-45, applicable to the sale of interests in ABLE programs by dealers.

Rule G-33 generally requires that brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) effecting transactions in municipal securities compute yields and dollar prices in accordance with the formulas prescribed.

Prior to an amendment effective February 23, 2016, Rule G-33(b)(i)(B)(2) and, by reference, (b)(ii)(B)(2), provided that, for interest-bearing municipal securities with periodic interest payments and more than six months to redemption, dealers compute the dollar price or yield using a formula that accounted for the present value of all future coupon payments and a semi-annual payment of interest. The formula in Rule G-33(b)(i)(B)(2) now provides a more precise pricing calculation when computing yields and dollar prices on securities with periodic interest payments and more than one coupon payment to redemption. Under the amended pricing formula, rather than presuming a semi-annual interest payment, the formula requires factoring in the actual interest payment frequency of the security (e.g., monthly, quarterly or annually).

The compliance date for Rule G-33, as amended, is July 18, 2016.  

Prior to July 18, 2016, a dealer will be deemed to be in compliance with Rules G-33(b)(i)(B)(2) and G-33(b)(ii)(B)(2) if calculating dollar price or yield for interest-bearing municipal securities with periodic interest payments and more than six months to redemption using the actual interest payment frequency rather than assuming a semi-annual payment. Beginning July 18, 2016, the compliance date for Rule G-33, as amended, all dealers will be required to factor in the actual interest payment frequency in calculating dollar price and yield for such securities.

All Rule G-37 interpretive guidance for dealers shall apply to the analogous interpretive issues for municipal advisors, with the exception of interpretive guidance issued on February 21, 1997, and April 2, 2002. See Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change Consisting of Proposed Amendments to Rule G-37, on Political Contributions and Municipal Securities Business, Rule G-8, on Books and Records, Rule G-9 on Preservation of Records, and Form G-37 and G-37x, Release No. 34-76763 (December 16, 2015), 80 FR 81710, at 81718, 81735 (December 30, 2015) (File No. SR-MSRB-2015-14).

I. PERSONS/ENTITIES SUBJECT TO THE RULE

I.1
Q: To whom does Rule G-37 apply?
A: In general, Rule G-37 applies to brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (collectively referred to as dealers), municipal finance professionals, and PACs controlled by the dealer or any municipal finance professional. In addition, the recordkeeping and disclosure provisions apply to non-MFP executive officers of the dealer.

(May 24, 1994)

II. PROHIBITION ON ENGAGING IN MUNICIPAL SECURITIES BUSINESS (Rule G-37(b))

II.1
Q: What actions would cause a dealer to be prohibited from engaging in municipal securities business with an issuer?
A: Rule G-37(b) prohibits a dealer from engaging in municipal securities business with an issuer within two years after any contribution to an official of such issuer made by: (i) the dealer, (ii) any municipal finance professional associated with such dealer; or (iii) any PAC controlled by the dealer or any municipal finance professional.

(May 24, 1994)

II.2
Q: Is there an exception to this prohibition on engaging in municipal securities business?
A: There is one exception to Rule G-37(b). The prohibition does not apply if the only contributions to officials of issuers are made by municipal finance professionals entitled to vote for such officials, and provided such contributions, in total, are not in excess of $250 by each such municipal finance professional to each official of such issuer, per election.

(May 24, 1994)

II.3
Q: What is the municipal securities business that a dealer would be banned from engaging in with an issuer if certain political contributions are made to officials of such issuers?
A: The term "municipal securities business" is defined in Rule G-37(g)(vii) to encompass certain activities of dealers, such as acting as negotiated underwriters (as managing underwriter or as syndicate member), financial advisors and consultants, placement agents, and negotiated remarketing agents. The rule does not prohibit a dealer from engaging in competitive underwritings or competitive remarketing services for the issuer.

(May 24, 1994)

II.4
Q: If a non-MFP executive officer makes a contribution to an official of an issuer, is the dealer prohibited from engaging in municipal securities business with that issuer?
A: No. The prohibition section applies only to contributions made by the dealer, its municipal finance professionals, or any PAC controlled by the dealer or any of its municipal finance professionals. The definition of non-MFP executive officer does not include any municipal finance professional. However, contributions by non-MFP executive officers are subject to the reporting/disclosure provisions of the rule. In addition, pursuant to section (d), dealers are prohibited from using non-MFP executive officers (as well as any other person or entity) as a conduit for making contributions to officials of issuers.

(May 24, 1994)

II.5
Q: Would a dealer be prohibited from engaging in municipal securities business with a state agency, whose board members are appointed by the governor, if the dealer makes contributions to the governor?
A: Yes, the definition of “official of an issuer” in Rule G-37(g)(vi) includes any person who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate for any elective office of a state or of any political subdivision, which office has authority to appoint any person who is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer for municipal securities business by an issuer.

(May 24, 1994, revised October 30, 2003)

II.6
Q: May a municipal finance professional who is entitled to vote for an issuer official make contributions to pay for such official’s transition or inaugural expenses without causing a prohibition on municipal securities business with the issuer?
A: Yes, under certain conditions. The de minimis exception allows a municipal finance professional to contribute up to $250 per candidate per election if the municipal finance professional is entitled to vote for that issuer official. The de minimis exception is keyed to an election cycle; therefore, if a municipal finance professional contributed $250 to the general election of an issuer official, the municipal finance professional would not be able to make any contributions to pay for transition or inaugural expenses without causing a prohibition on municipal securities business with the issuer. If a municipal finance professional made no contributions to an issuer official prior to the election, then the municipal finance professional may, if entitled to vote for the candidate, contribute up to $250 to pay for transition or inaugural expenses and payment of debt incurred in connection with the election without causing a prohibition on municipal securities business.

(September 9, 1997)

II.7
Q: Are any payments made to issuer officials, other than political contributions, covered by the rule?
A: No. However, any other payments may be subject to Rule G‑20 on gifts and gratuities.

(May 24, 1994)

Primary, State Caucus or Convention

II.8
Q: If an issuer official is involved in a primary election prior to the general election, may a municipal finance professional who is entitled to vote for such official contribute $250 to the issuer official's primary as well as general election?
A: Yes, the municipal finance professional could contribute up to $500 to each such official (i.e., $250 per election).

(May 24, 1994)

II.9
Q: If the locality in which the incumbent or candidate is seeking election as an issuer official holds a convention or caucus (instead of a primary election) prior to the general election, may a municipal finance professional entitled to vote in that locality contribute $250 to the incumbent or candidate's convention or caucus election campaign, as well as $250 to the incumbent or candidate's general election, without causing a ban on municipal securities business with the issuer?
A: Yes, if the issuer official has been qualified to be considered at the state caucus or convention.

(June 15, 1995)

MFP as Incumbent or Candidate

II.10
Q: If a municipal finance professional also is an incumbent or candidate for political office in a municipality in which the municipal finance professional's employer (i.e., the dealer) conducts municipal securities business, must the dealer terminate the municipal finance professional or are there any restrictions on the kind of business a dealer can engage in with that issuer?
A: No. However, the dealer, any municipal finance professional and any PAC controlled by the dealer or municipal finance professional must ensure that the dealer does not engage in municipal securities business with the issuer if contributions (other than the de minimis contributions allowed under section (b)) are made to an official of the issuer. The municipal finance professional who is an incumbent or candidate for office is not limited to contributing the de minimis amount to his or her own campaign in such instances.

(May 24, 1994)

Attendance at Fund-Raising Dinner

II.11
Q: May a dealer continue to engage in municipal securities business with an issuer if a municipal finance professional pays for and attends a fund-raising dinner for a candidate who is seeking election to a position as an official of such issuer?
A: A municipal finance professional who contributes funds in this instance would subject the dealer to a prohibition on municipal securities business with the issuer unless the municipal finance professional is entitled to vote for such candidate and any contributions do not exceed $250 to such candidate per election. In addition, any municipal finance professional who attends the dinner for the purpose of soliciting contributions by others for the issuer official would violate Rule G-37's prohibition on soliciting contributions. See also Rule G-37(c).

(May 24, 1994)

Two-Year Look Back

II.12
Q: A municipal finance professional (i.e., a municipal investment banker subject to the two year look back) was associated with dealer X at the time he made a contribution which resulted in the dealer being prohibited from engaging in municipal securities business with the issuer. Then, less than two years after making the contribution, the municipal finance professional becomes associated with dealer Y. Is dealer Y also subject to the prohibition on business?
A: Both dealers are subject to the prohibition for two years from the date the municipal finance professional made the contribution. Of course, dealer Y's prohibition on business only begins when the municipal finance professional becomes associated with that dealer.

(May 24, 1994, revised October 30, 2003)

II.13
Q: Prior to becoming associated with any dealer, a person makes a contribution to an issuer official. Less than two years after making the contribution, that person becomes a municipal finance professional (i.e., a municipal investment banker subject to the two year look back). Would the hiring dealer be prohibited from engaging in municipal securities business with that issuer?
A: Yes. Rule G-37 attempts to sever any connection between the making of contributions and the awarding of municipal securities business by prohibiting the dealer from engaging in municipal securities business with the issuer for two years from the date the contribution was made. As noted above, the dealer's prohibition on business would begin when the municipal finance professional becomes associated with that dealer. Thus, if the individual was hired, for example, six months after making the contribution, then the dealer's prohibition on business would extend for one and one half years.

(May 24, 1994, revised October 30, 2003)

II.14
Q: If a dealer hires an individual as a retail sales person, would the contributions made by that person prior to being hired subject the dealer to the two-year prohibition on municipal securities business?
A: The rule's two-year prohibition is triggered by contributions by dealers, municipal finance professionals, and political action committees controlled by a dealer or a municipal finance professional. If a retail sales person is not a municipal finance professional and does not become a municipal finance professional within two years after making a contribution to an issuer official, then such contributions will not trigger the ban on business. However, if the retail sales person is, or within two years becomes, a municipal finance professional (e.g., by solicitation of officials of an issuer), then contributions made by that person will subject the hiring dealer to the two-year ban on business. A retail sales person would not be considered to be a municipal finance professional solely because of his or her municipal securities retail sales activities. (See Rule G-37(g)(iv)).

(December 7, 1994, revised October 30, 2003)

II.15
Q: A person is associated with a dealer in a non-municipal finance professional capacity, and makes a contribution to an issuer official. Less than two years after making the contribution, that person becomes a municipal finance professional (i.e., a municipal investment banker subject to the two year look back). Would the dealer be prohibited from engaging in a negotiated underwriting with that issuer?
A: Yes, the dealer is subject to the prohibition for two years from the date the contribution was made.

(May 24, 1994, revised October 30, 2003)

II.16
Q: A person is associated with a dealer in a non-municipal finance professional capacity and makes a political contribution to an official of an issuer for whom such person is not entitled to vote. Less than two years after such person made the contribution, the dealer merges with another dealer and, solely as a result of the merger, that person becomes a municipal finance professional of the surviving dealer. Would the surviving dealer be prohibited from engaging in municipal securities business with that issuer?
A: Yes. Rule G-37 would prohibit the surviving dealer from engaging in municipal securities business with the issuer for two years from the date the contribution was made. Of course, the surviving dealer’s prohibition on business would only begin when the person who made the contribution becomes a municipal finance professional of the surviving dealer.

The Board notes, however, that Rule G-37 was not intended to prevent mergers in the municipal securities industry or, once a merger is consummated, to seriously hinder the surviving dealer’s municipal securities business if the merger was not an attempt to circumvent the letter or spirit of rule G-37. Thus, the dealer may wish to seek an exemption from the ban on business pursuant to Rule G-37(i) from its appropriate regulatory authority.

(June 29, 1998, revised October 30, 2003)

Refund of Inadvertent Contribution

II.17
Q: A disgruntled municipal finance professional made a contribution purposely to subject the dealer to the two-year prohibition on business. When the contribution is discovered by the dealer, a refund of the contribution is requested and obtained. Is the dealer still banned from engaging in business with that issuer? In addition, does the contribution have to be disclosed on Form G-37?
A: Rule G-37(b) prohibits a dealer from engaging in municipal securities business with an issuer within two years after any contribution to an official of such issuer by any municipal finance professional associated with such dealer if the contribution does not meet the de minimis exemption. Section (i) of the rule provides a procedure whereby dealers may seek relief from the appropriate enforcement agency of the rule G-37 prohibition on business. In determining whether to grant such an exemption, one of the factors the enforcement agency will consider is whether the dealer has taken all available steps to obtain a return of the contribution. Even if a refund of the contribution has been obtained, dealers are required to seek an exemption from the ban on business. In addition, dealers also must disclose the contribution on Form G-37. Dealers may wish to indicate on the form (and in their own records) that a refund of the contribution was obtained. See Rule G-37(i).

(August 18, 1994)

Volunteer Work

II.18
Q: Is a municipal finance professional prohibited from performing volunteer work on an issuer official's behalf?
A: Rule G-37 is not intended to prohibit or restrict municipal finance professionals from engaging in personal volunteer work. However, soliciting and bundling of contributions would invoke application of the rule. In addition, if the municipal finance professional uses the dealer's resources (e.g., a political position paper prepared by dealer personnel) or incurs expenses in the conduct of such volunteer work (e.g., hosting a reception), then the value of such resources or expenses would constitute a contribution. Personal expenses incurred by the municipal finance professional in the conduct of such volunteer work, which expenses are purely incidental to such work and unreimbursed by the dealer (e.g., cab fares and personal meals), would not constitute a contribution.

(May 24, 1994)

Dealer Resources

II.19
Q: If an employee of a dealer is donating his or her time to an issuer official's campaign, does the dealer have to disclose this as a contribution to such official? In addition, would the fact that the employee is taking a leave of absence from the dealer cause a different result?
A: An employee of a dealer generally can donate his or her time to an issuer official's campaign without this being viewed as a contribution by the dealer to the official, as long as the employee is volunteering his or her time during non-work hours, or is using previously accrued vacation time or the dealer is not otherwise paying the employee's salary (e.g., an unpaid leave of absence).

(August 18, 1994)

Making Contributions to Issuer Officials on Behalf of Other Persons

II.20
Q: A municipal finance professional signs a check drawn on a joint account, which is owned by the municipal finance professional and another person, and submits it to an issuer official as a contribution along with a writing which states that the contribution is being made solely by the other holder of the joint account. Would any portion of this contribution be attributable to the municipal finance professional under Rule G-37?
A: If a municipal finance professional signs a check, whether the check was drawn on a joint account or not, and submits it as a contribution to an issuer official, then the municipal finance professional is deemed to have made the full contribution, regardless of any writing accompanying the check that provides or directs otherwise. Moreover, if this amount exceeds, or does not qualify for, the de minimis exception, then by making such a contribution the municipal finance professional will trigger the rule's ban on business thereby prohibiting his dealer/employer from engaging in municipal securities business with the particular issuer for two years.

(February 16, 1996)

II.21
Q: If a municipal finance professional and another person (e.g., her spouse) both sign a check drawn on their joint account and submit the check to an issuer official as a contribution, would the contribution amount be attributable equally between them (i.e., 50% to each person) for purposes of Rule G-37?
A: Yes. If a municipal finance professional and any other person both sign a check drawn on their joint account and submit it to an issuer official as a contribution, then each person is deemed to have made half of the contribution, regardless of any writing accompanying the check that provides or directs otherwise.

(February 16, 1996)

Making Contributions to a Candidate Who Later Loses the Election

II.22
Q: If a municipal finance professional made a political contribution which was not subject to the de minimis exception to an issuer official candidate who subsequently did not win the election, is the dealer banned from engaging in municipal securities business with that issuer (i.e., the governmental entity)?
A: Yes. Rule G-37 defines the term "official of such issuer" or "official of an issuer" as "any person (including any election committee for such person) who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate: (A) for elective office of the issuer which office is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer for municipal securities business by the issuer; or (B) for any elective office of a state or of any political subdivision, which office has authority to appoint any official(s) of an issuer, as defined in subparagraph (A), above." It is clear from the rule that, at the time the contribution is made, if the recipient of that contribution is an "official of an issuer," then the dealer is subject to the two-year ban on business with the issuer, regardless of whether the candidate wins or loses the election. Any other result would mean that municipal finance professionals could make contributions to issuer officials, but the ban on business would not be triggered (if at all) until election results were known.

(February 16, 1996)

III. INDIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS (Rule G-37(d))

Contributions by Spouses and Household Members

III.1
Q: Are contributions to issuer officials by municipal finance professionals’ spouses and household members covered by the rule?
A: No, unless these contributions are directed by the municipal finance professional, which is prohibited by section (d) of the rule.

(May 24, 1994)

III.2
Q: If a municipal finance professional directs a retail sales person (who is not a municipal finance professional) to make a political contribution to an issuer official, would this trigger the rule's two-year prohibition on business with that issuer?
A: Yes. Section (d) of the rule prohibits municipal finance professionals (and dealers) from using any person or means to do, directly or indirectly, any act which would violate the rule. In other words, a municipal finance professional is prohibited from using a sales person (or any other person not otherwise subject to the rule) as a conduit to circumvent the rule. Thus, contributions made, directly or indirectly, by a municipal finance professional (or a dealer) to an issuer official will subject the dealer to the rule's two-year prohibition on municipal securities business with that issuer. In addition to triggering the prohibition, the municipal finance professional in this case has violated section (d) of the rule.

(December 7, 1994)

Political Parties

III.3
Q: Are contributions to national, state or local political parties covered by the rule?
A: Any such contributions would not trigger the prohibition on business portion of the rule (section (b)) unless such entities are used as a conduit to indirectly contribute to an issuer official, which is prohibited by section (d) of the rule. However, contributions to state or local political parties must be recorded under Rule G-8(a)(xvi) and disclosed in summary form under Rule G‑37(e), except for those contributions which meet the de minimis exemption. See also Rule G-37(e).

(May 24, 1994)

Contributions to a Non-Dealer Associated PAC and Payments to a State or Local Political Party

III.4
Q: Could contributions to a non-dealer associated PAC or payments to a state or local political party lead to a ban on municipal securities business with an issuer under Rule G-37?
A: Rule G-37(d) prohibits a dealer and any municipal finance professional from doing any act indirectly which would result in a violation of the rule if done directly by the dealer or municipal finance professional. A dealer would violate Rule G-37 by doing business with an issuer after providing money to any person or entity when the dealer knows that such money will be given to an official of an issuer who could not receive such a contribution directly from the dealer without triggering the rule’s prohibition on business. For example, in certain instances, a non-dealer associated PAC or a local political party may be soliciting funds for the purpose of supporting a limited number of issuer officials. Depending upon the facts and circumstances, contributions to the PAC or payments to the political party might well result in the same prohibition on municipal securities business as would a contribution made directly to the issuer official. (August 6, 1996)

III.5
Q: If a dealer receives a fund raising solicitation from a non-dealer associated PAC or a political party with no indication of how the collected funds will be used, can the dealer make contributions to the non-dealer associated PAC or payments to the political party without causing a ban on municipal securities business?
A: Dealers should inquire of the non-dealer associated PAC or political party how any funds received from the dealer would be used. For example, if the non-dealer associated PAC or political party is soliciting funds for the purpose of supporting a limited number of issuer officials, then, depending upon the facts and circumstances, contributions to the PAC or payments to the political party might well result in the same prohibition on municipal securities business as would a contribution made directly to the issuer official.

(August 6, 1996)

Making Payments to a National Political Party for its Non-Federal Account (Rule G-37(e))

III.6
Q: If a national political party accepts payments in which contributors have designated that their payments be deposited into the account for a state or local political party, must the dealer record such payments and report them on Form G-37?
A: Yes. Rule G-37 requires that dealers record and report payments made to state and local political parties and the ultimate recipient in the above scenario is a state or local political party so designated by the contributor.

(February 16, 1996)

Supervisory Procedures Relating to Indirect Contributions

III.7
Q: Is a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (“dealer”) required to have written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure compliance with Rule G-37(d), on indirect contributions and solicitations, with regard to payments to political parties and PACs by a dealer or its municipal finance professionals (“MFPs”)?
A: Yes. The relevant portion of the MSRB's supervision rule, Rule G-27(c), provides that, “Each dealer shall adopt, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the conduct of the municipal securities activities of the dealer and its associated persons are in compliance [with MSRB rules].”

Rule G-37(d) provides that: “No broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer or any municipal finance professional of the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer shall, directly or indirectly, through or by any other person or means, do any act which would result in a violation of sections (b) or (c) of this rule.” While Rule G-37 was adopted to deal specifically with contributions made to officials of issuers by dealers and municipal finance professionals, and political action committees (“PACs”) controlled by dealers or MFPs, this section of the rule also prohibits MFPs and dealers from using conduits—such as, but not limited to parties, PACs, affiliates, consultants, lawyers or spouses—to contribute indirectly to an issuer official if such MFP or dealer can not give directly to the issuer without triggering the ban on business.

In order to ensure compliance with Rule G-27(c) as it relates to payments to political parties or PACs and Rule G-37(d), each dealer must adopt, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that neither the dealer nor its MFPs are using payments to political parties and non-dealer controlled PACs to contribute indirectly to an official of an issuer.[1] For example, a dealer's written supervisory procedures might provide that, if the dealer or any of its MFPs want to make payments to political parties or PACs, the dealer must perform adequate due diligence prior to allowing political party or PAC payments by the dealer or its MFPs to reasonably ensure that neither the dealer nor its MFPs are using payments to political parties or non-dealer controlled PACs to contribute indirectly to an official of an issuer. [2] Such due diligence also might include inquiring about and documenting the intent or motive in making the payment, whether the party payment or PAC contribution was solicited by anyone, and if so, the identification of the person soliciting the party payment and a record of written solicitations. This information will assist the dealer in determining whether the facts and circumstances surrounding the payment support the reason given for making the payment.

In addition, to ensure compliance with Rule G-37(d) in connection with contributions by dealers or MFPs to non-controlled (but affiliated) PACs,[3]

the dealer might adopt information barriers between any affiliated PACs and the dealer or its MFPs. Examples of such information barrier provisions might include such things as:

• a prohibition on the dealer or MFPs from recommending, nominating, appointing or approving the management of affiliated PACs;

• a prohibition on sharing the affiliated PAC's meeting agenda, meeting schedule, or meeting minutes;

• a prohibition on identification of prior affiliated PAC contributions, planned PAC contributions or anticipated PAC contributions;

• a prohibition on directly providing or coordinating information about prior negotiated municipal securities business, solicited municipal securities business, and planned solicitations of municipal securities business; and

• other such information barriers as the firm deems appropriate to effectively monitor conflicting interests and prevent abuses.

These examples are not exclusive and are only suggestions for supervisory procedures that dealers could consider. Each dealer is required under Rule G-27, on supervision, to evaluate its own circumstances and develop written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the conduct of the municipal securities activities of the dealer and its associated persons are in compliance with Rule G-37, on indirect violations.

(September 22, 2005)

[1] In addition, pursuant to MSRB Rule G-8(a)(xx), on Records Concerning Compliance with Rule G-27, each dealer must maintain and keep current the records required under Rules G-27(c) and G-27 (d).

[2] See Rule G-37 Questions and Answers Nos. III. 4 and III.5, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.

[3] For the purposes of this guidance the term “affiliated PAC” means a PAC controlled by an affiliated entity of a dealer. An “affiliated entity” is an entity that controls, is controlled by or is under common control with the dealer.

III.8
Q: Is a dealer required to have written supervisory procedures in place to ensure compliance with Rule G-37(d) if the dealer only allows the dealer or its municipal finance professionals (“MFPs”) to make political party payments to “housekeeping”, “conference” or “overhead” type accounts of a political party?
A: Yes. There is no safe harbor under Rule G-37 for payments to “housekeeping”, “conference” or “overhead” type political party accounts. The dealer must have adequate supervisory procedures reasonably designed to prevent a violation of Rule G-37(d), on indirect political contributions, even when the payments are being made to a “housekeeping”, “conference” or “overhead” type account. While the political party itself may prohibit direct contributions to issuer official candidates from “housekeeping” accounts, payments to these accounts might be used for political party events that are focused to benefit a specific candidate or a small number of candidates. Additionally, because money is fungible, a payment made to a fund earmarked for non-issuer official elections might “free up” other money to support the candidacy of specific issuer officials.

The need for dealers to adopt adequate written supervisory procedures to prevent indirect violations via “housekeeping”, “conference” or “overhead” type political party accounts is especially important in light of media and other reports that issuer agents have informed dealers and MFPs that, if they are prohibited from contributing directly to an issuer official's campaign, they should contribute to an affiliated party's “housekeeping” account. In addition, NASD staff has informed the MSRB that some firms make contributions to “housekeeping” accounts or PAC's with explicit instructions accompanying the payment that the specific payment is not to be used for the benefit of one or a limited number of issuer officials. The MSRB does not consider such “preemptive” disclosures or instructions sufficient to meet the dealer's obligation to perform due diligence to reasonably ensure that the payment to the political party or PAC is not being made to circumvent the requirements of Rule G-37.

(September 22, 2005)

IV. DEFINITIONS (Rule G-37(g))

Contribution

IV.1
Q: How is the term "contribution" defined in Rule G-37?
A: The term "contribution" is defined in Rule G-37(g)(i) to mean any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made: (i) for the purpose of influencing any election for federal, state or local office; (ii) for payment of debt incurred in connection with any such election; or (iii) for transition or inaugural expenses incurred by the successful candidate for state or local office.

(May 24, 1994)

IV.2
Q: Is Rule G-37 applicable to contributions given to officials of issuers who are seeking election to federal office, such as the House of Representatives, the Senate or the Presidency?
A: Yes. Rule G-37(g)(i) defines “contribution” as, among other things, any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value made for the purpose of influencing any election for federal, state or local office.

(June 15, 1995)

IV.3
Q: Does Rule G-37 encompass all contributions to candidates for federal office?
A: No. Rule G-37 encompasses, for federal offices, only those contributions to an official of an issuer who is seeking election to a federal office.

(May 24, 1994)

IV.4
Q: Are contributions to bond ballot campaigns subject to the requirements of Rule G-37.
A: Such political contributions are subject to the disclosure requirements of Rule G-37(e) (other than contributions made by a municipal finance professional or a non-MFP executive officer to a bond ballot campaign for a ballot initiative with respect to which such person is entitled to vote if all contributions by such person to such bond ballot campaign, in total, do not exceed $250 per ballot initiative). Although such contributions will not result in a ban on municipal securities business under Rule G-37(b), as with all MSRB rules, failure to comply with requirements of the rule (i.e., by failing to disclose such contributions) may subject dealers to fines and other disciplinary actions by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, or other appropriate regulatory agencies.

(May 24, 1994, revised February 25, 2010)

Charitable Donations

IV.5
Q: Would a charitable donation to an organization made by a dealer at the request of an issuer official meet the definition of "contribution" in Rule G-37?
A: No. Charitable donations are not considered political contributions for purposes of Rule G‑37 and therefore are not covered by the rule.

(May 24, 1994)

Municipal Finance Professional

IV.6
Q: Who is considered a municipal finance professional?
A: To determine if a particular person is a municipal finance professional, first determine whether the person is an "associated person" of a dealer (other than a bank dealer) under Section 3(a)(18) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Act), or an associated person of a bank dealer under Section 3(a)(32) of the Act. Then determine whether the associated person fits within one of the four categories listed in the definition of municipal finance professional under Rule G-37.

Under Section 3(a)(18) of the Act, "associated person of a broker or dealer" is defined as:

• Any partner, officer, director, or branch manager (or any person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions);
• Any person directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by, or under common control with the dealer;
• Or any employee of such broker or dealer, except those whose functions are solely clerical or ministerial.

Under Section 3(a)(32) of the Act, "person associated with a municipal securities dealer" when used with respect to a municipal securities dealer which is a bank or a division or department of a bank means:

• Any person directly engaged in the management, direction, supervision, or performance of any of the municipal securities dealer’s activities with respect to municipal securities; and
• Any person directly or indirectly controlling such activities or controlled by the municipal securities dealer in connection with such activities.

Under Rule G-37(g)(iv), a municipal finance professional is defined as:

1. Any associated person primarily engaged in municipal representative activities pursuant to Rule G-3(a)(i) (such activities include underwriting, trading, sales, financial advisory and consultant services, research or investment advice on municipal securities, or any other activities which involve communication, directly or indirectly, with public investors relating to the activities listed in this paragraph), provided, however, that sales activities with natural persons shall not be considered to be municipal securities representative activities for purposes of Rule G-37(g)(iv);

2. Any associated person who solicits "municipal securities business" as defined in Rule G-37 (which includes negotiated underwriting activities, private placement activities, negotiated remarketing services, financial advisory and consultant services);

3. Any associated person who is both (i) a municipal securities principal or a municipal securities sales principal and (ii) a supervisor of any persons described in paragraphs 1 or 2 above;

4. Any associated person who is a supervisor of the associated persons described in paragraph 3 above, up through and including: (i) for dealers that are not bank dealers, the CEO or similarly situated official; and (ii) for bank dealers, the officer or officers designated by the bank's board of directors as responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the bank's dealer activities.

5. For dealers other than bank dealers: any associated person who is a member of the executive or management committee, or similarly situated officials, if any. For bank dealers: any member of the executive or management committee of the separately identifiable department or division of the bank, as defined in Rule G‑1, if any. However, if the only associated persons meeting the definition of municipal finance professional are those described in this paragraph 5, the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer shall be deemed to have no municipal finance professionals.

Each person listed by the dealer as a municipal finance professional is deemed to be such for purposes of Rule G-37.

(May 24, 1994, revised October 30, 2003)

IV.7
Q: Does the definition of municipal finance professional include all registered representatives?
A: No. The definition of municipal finance professional includes, among others, any associated person primarily engaged in municipal representative activities pursuant to Rule G-3(a)(i), but excludes sales activities with natural persons.

(May 24, 1994, revised October 30, 2003)

IV.8
Q: Does the definition of municipal finance professional include any associated person who solicits municipal securities business, even if this solicitation activity is a very small portion of the associated person's work?
A: Yes. Even if an associated person is not "primarily engaged in municipal representative activities," that associated person can be considered a municipal finance professional if he or she solicits municipal securities business, as defined in Rule G-37 (such business includes negotiated underwriting activities, private placement activities, negotiated remarketing services, financial advisory and consultant services).

(May 24, 1994)

IV.9
Q: Does the definition of municipal finance professional include anyone other than an associated person of the dealer, for example, consultants, lawyers or spouses of municipal finance professionals?
A: No. Municipal finance professionals must be associated persons of the dealer. Of course, if a dealer or a municipal finance professional seeks indirectly to make contributions to issuer officials through consultants, lawyers or spouses, such contributions would result in the dealer being prohibited from engaging in municipal securities business with the issuer for two years from the date of such contributions.

(May 24, 1994)

Finder’s Fee

IV.10 & IV.11 Deleted

IV.12
Q: Is a "finder's fee" solely cash compensation?
A: No. Such compensation, for example, may take the form of: (i) an unusually large allocation of bonds to a particular sales person; (ii) sales credits; or (iii) any other kind of remuneration.

(December 7, 1994)

IV. 13 Deleted

Supervisors

IV.14
Q: A sales representative at a branch office solicits municipal securities business for the dealer. Such activity results in that person becoming a "municipal finance professional" under Rule G-37(g)(iv)(B). Would that person's branch manager also be considered a municipal finance professional?
A: Yes. Rule G-37(g)(iv)(C) provides that the definition of municipal finance professional includes, among others, any associated person who is both a (i) municipal securities principal or a municipal securities sales principal and (ii) a supervisor of any associated person who solicits municipal securities business (or who is primarily engaged in municipal securities representative activities). If a sales person is soliciting municipal securities business, then the supervisor of that person (i.e., the branch manager) also is included within the definition of municipal finance professional. Branch managers are included within the definition of municipal finance professional in the circumstances described above.

(March 22, 1995, revised October 30, 2003)

Designation Period for Municipal Finance Professionals

IV.15
Q: Rule G-37(g)(iv) states that each person designated a municipal finance professional shall retain this designation for one year after the last activity or position which gave rise to the designation. If a dealer terminates a municipal finance professional’s employment, and that person is no longer associated in any way with the dealer (including any affiliated entities of the dealer), must the dealer continue to designate that person a “municipal finance professional” for recordkeeping and reporting purposes under Rules G-37(g)(iv) and G-8(a)(xvi)?
A: No. If a municipal finance professional is no longer employed by the dealer, and is not an “associated person” of the dealer, then the dealer is not required to designate that person a municipal finance professional and the dealer may cease its recordkeeping and reporting obligations with respect to that person.

(August 6, 1996, revised October 30, 2003)

IV.16
Q: If a municipal finance professional is transferred from a firm’s dealer department to another non-municipal department, such as the corporate department, must the dealer continue to designate this person a municipal finance professional for recordkeeping and reporting purposes?
A: If a municipal finance professional is transferred to another department within the same firm (such as corporate, equities, etc.) and remains an “associated person” of the dealer, the dealer must continue to designate this person a municipal finance professional for one year from the date of the last activity or position which gave rise to this designation and must continue its recordkeeping and reporting obligations under Rules G-37 and G-8. It is incumbent upon each dealer to determine whether the person is an associated person pursuant to Section 3(a)(18) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. If so, then in addition to recordkeeping and reporting obligations, dealers should be mindful that any contributions made by this associated person during the one-year designation period (other than contributions that qualify for the rule’s $250 de minimis exception) will subject the dealer to the rule’s ban on municipal securities business for two years from the date of such contribution. Of course, the ban can only be triggered if the person previously was a municipal finance professional.

(August 6, 1996, revised October 30, 2003)

IV.17
Q: A municipal finance professional resigns from a dealer, but still remains an associated person of the dealer (e.g., by retaining a position in the dealer’s holding company). May the dealer cease designating this person a municipal finance professional for purposes of the recordkeeping and reporting requirements under Rules G-37 and G-8? In addition, may this person make contributions to issuer officials without causing the dealer to be banned from municipal securities business with such issuers?
A: If a person is no longer a municipal finance professional because he or she has left the dealer’s employ, but nevertheless remains an associated person of the dealer, then the dealer must continue to designate this person a municipal finance professional for one year from the last activity or position which gave rise to such designation. Moreover, any contributions by this associated person (other than those that qualify for the de minimis exception under Rule G-37(b)) will subject the dealer to the rule’s ban on municipal securities business for two years from the date of the contribution.

(August 6, 1996, revised October 30, 2003)

IV.18
Q: In making the determination of which associated persons of a dealer meet the definitions of municipal finance professional and non-MFP executive officer, is it correct to designate all the executives of the dealer (e.g., President, Executive Vice Presidents) under the category of non-MFP executive officers?
A: No. In making the determination of whether someone is a municipal finance professional or non-MFP executive officer, one must review the activities of the individual and not his or her title. Rule G-37(g)(iv) defines the term “municipal finance professional” as:

(A) any associated person primarily engaged in municipal securities representative activities, as defined in Rule G-3(a)(i), provided, however, that sales activities with natural persons shall not be considered to be municipal securities representative activities for purposes of this subparagraph (A);

(B) any associated person who solicits municipal securities business, as defined in paragraph (vii);

(C) any associated person who is both (i) a municipal securities principal or a municipal securities sales principal and (ii) a supervisor of any persons described in subparagraphs (A) or (B);

(D) any associated person who is a supervisor of any person described in subparagraph (C) up through and including, in the case of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer other than a bank dealer, the Chief Executive Officer or similarly situated official and, in the case of a bank dealer, the officer or officers designated by the board of directors of the bank as responsible for the day-to-day conduct of the bank’s municipal securities dealer activities, as required pursuant to Rule G-1(a); or

(E) any associated person who is a member of the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (or, in the case of a bank dealer, the separately identifiable department or division of the bank, as defined in Rule G-1) executive or management committee or similarly situated officials, if any; provided, however, that, if the only associated persons meeting the definition of municipal finance professional are those described in this subparagraph (E), the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer shall be deemed to have no municipal finance professionals.

Rule G-37(g)(v) defines the term “non-MFP executive officer” as:

an associated person in charge of a principal business unit, division or function or any other person who performs similar policy making functions for the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (or, in the case of a bank dealer, the separately identifiable department or division of the bank, as defined in Rule G-1), but does not include any municipal finance professional, as defined in paragraph (iv) of this section (g); provided, however, that, if no associated person of the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer meets the definition of municipal finance professional, the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer shall be deemed to have no non-MFP executive officers. [emphasis added]

Dealers should first review the activities of their associated persons to determine whether they are municipal finance professionals, and then, once that list of individuals has been established, conduct a review of the remaining associated persons to determine whether they are non-MFP executive officers. Dealers should pay close attention to those associated persons who are soliciting municipal securities business and, thus, will be considered municipal finance professionals.

(September 9, 1997, revised October 30, 2003 and June 8, 2006)

Non-MFP Executive Officer

IV.19
Q: Who is a non-MFP "executive officer?"
A: Pursuant to Rule G-37(g)(v), a non-MFP executive officer is defined as any associated person in charge of a principal business unit, division or function, or any other person who performs similar policy making functions for the dealer (or, in the case of a bank dealer, the separately identifiable department or division of the bank, as defined in Rule G-1), but does not include any municipal finance professional.

(May 24, 1994)

IV.20
Q: In a bank with a separately identifiable dealer department, who would be considered a non-MFP executive officer?
A: For most bank dealer departments which deal only in municipal securities, there are no individuals who meet the definition of non-MFP executive officer within Rule G-37.

(August 18, 1994)

Official of an Issuer

IV.21
Q: How is the term "official of an issuer" defined in Rule G-37?
A: Rule G-37(g)(vi) defines the term "official of an issuer" to mean “any person (including any election committee for such person) who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate: (A) for elective office of the issuer which office is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer for municipal securities business by the issuer; or (B) for any elective office of a state or of any political subdivision, which office has authority to appoint any person who is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer for municipal securities business by an issuer. Thus, contributions to certain state-wide executive or legislative officials would be included within the prohibition on engaging in municipal securities business.

(May 24, 1994, revised October 30, 2003)

IV.22
Q: How can a dealer determine whether an incumbent or candidate for a particular elective office will be able to award or influence the awarding of municipal securities business? For example, in many states, such influence is found in executive branch elected officials, not legislative branch officials.
A: The dealer must review the scope of authority of the particular office at issue, whether executive or legislative branch, not the individual, to determine whether influence over the awarding of municipal securities business is present.

(May 24, 1994)

IV.23
Q: An incumbent was seeking re-election as an issuer official but she lost the election. She is now soliciting money to pay for the debt incurred in connection with this election. Would there be a prohibition on engaging in municipal securities business with the issuer if a dealer or a municipal finance professional provides money for the payment of this debt?
A: No, under certain conditions. If the incumbent is out of office at the time she is soliciting money to pay for the election debt, then she is no longer considered to be within the definition of “official of an issuer” and any monies given for the payment of debt incurred in connection with the election in this instance is not subject to Rule G-37. If the incumbent still holds her issuer official position at the time she is soliciting money to pay for the election debt, then, if a municipal finance professional contributed $250 to her during the general election, the municipal finance professional would not be able to make any contributions for the payment of debt without causing a prohibition on municipal securities business with the issuer. If a municipal finance professional made no contributions to the incumbent prior to the election, then the municipal finance professional may, if entitled to vote for the candidate, contribute up to $250 for the payment of debt incurred in connection with the election while the incumbent is still in office without causing a prohibition on municipal securities business. A dealer may not contribute any monies towards the payment of debt while the incumbent is still in office without causing a prohibition on municipal securities business with the issuer.

(September 9, 1997)

Dealer-Controlled PAC

(As updated February 7, 2019)

Background

MSRB Rule G-18, establishing the first best-execution rule for transactions in municipal securities, became effective March 21, 2016. The best-execution rule requires brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (dealers) to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for the subject security and buy or sell in that market so that the resultant price to the customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions. Related amendments to MSRB Rule G‑48, on transactions with sophisticated municipal market professionals (SMMPs), and to MSRB Rule D-15, on the definition of an SMMP, exempt transactions with SMMPs from the best-execution rule. This implementation guidance provides answers to frequently asked questions about the best-execution rule and the SMMP exemption.

Use of This Document

The MSRB is providing in this document general implementation guidance on certain aspects of new Rule G-18 and amended Rules G-48 and D-15 (rules) in a question-and-answer format. This guidance is designed to support compliance with the best-execution rule and the SMMP exemption.[1] The answers are not considered rules and have neither been approved nor disapproved by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).

The MSRB may update these questions and answers periodically, and any updates will include appropriate references to dates of new or modified questions and answers.

Questions and Answers Concerning Best Execution and the Exemption for Transactions with Sophisticated Municipal Market Professionals:  Rules G-18, G-48 and D-15

I. Best-Execution Standard – General

I.1: Reasonable Diligence

Q: What do dealers need to do to use reasonable diligence when selling (purchasing) municipal securities out of (into) their inventory to (from) customers[2] who are not sophisticated municipal market professionals (SMMPs)?[3]

A: Overview of Best-Execution Standard. Section (a) of MSRB Rule G-18, on best execution, requires dealers, in any transaction for or with a customer or a customer of another dealer, to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for the subject security and to buy or sell in that market so that the resultant price to the customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions. This obligation applies to transactions in which the dealer is acting as agent and transactions in which the dealer is acting as principal.[4] Section (a) includes a non-exhaustive list of factors that dealers must consider when exercising this diligence, which includes: the character of the market for the security (e.g., price, volatility, and relative liquidity), the size and type of transaction, the number of markets checked, the information reviewed to determine the current market for the subject security or similar securities, the accessibility of quotations, and the terms and conditions of the customer’s inquiry or order, including any bids or offers, that result in the transaction, as communicated to the dealer. A dealer must make every effort to execute a customer transaction promptly,[5] but the determination as to whether a firm exercised reasonable diligence necessarily involves a “facts and circumstances” analysis, and actions that in one instance may meet a dealer’s best-execution obligation may not satisfy that obligation under another set of circumstances. The rule is designed to complement existing fair and reasonable pricing standards and improve execution quality for retail investors in municipal securities, while promoting fair competition among dealers and improving market efficiency.

Policies and Procedures. As explained during the rulemaking process for the best-execution rule, dealers can use reasonable diligence in ascertaining the best market for a security by using sound policies and procedures and periodically reviewing and improving them. Indeed, paragraph .08 of the Supplementary Material requires the development of policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve best execution. Paragraph .08 requires dealers to conduct, at a minimum, annual reviews of their policies and procedures for determining the best available market, assessing whether they are reasonably designed to achieve best execution, taking into account the quality of the executions the dealer is obtaining under its current policies and procedures, changes in market structure, new entrants, the availability of additional pre-trade and post-trade data, and the availability of new technologies, and to make promptly any necessary modifications of their policies and procedures in light of those reviews.[6] In short, a dealer can comply with the requirement to use reasonable diligence by developing, following and maintaining policies and procedures that are themselves reasonably designed.

Rule G-18 is designed to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate the diverse population of dealers, which can adopt policies and procedures to be reasonably related to the nature of their business, including the level of sales and trading activity and the type of customer transactions at issue, and to allow dealers to evidence that they had used reasonable diligence in a manner that is different than that used by other dealers. However, in developing policies and procedures, dealers should consider reviewing and including in their policies and procedures the existing practices of their trading operations, existing best practices within the municipal securities market (particularly those used by similarly-situated dealers), existing best practices in the corporate debt securities market with respect to compliance with FINRA Rule 5310, which requires, among other things, best execution for transactions in corporate debt securities, and any other practices they believe to be relevant. By way of example, if similarly-situated dealers in the municipal securities market typically take certain steps when purchasing municipal securities from a customer, dealers should consider whether their written policies and procedures should provide for those steps to be taken on a consistent and systematic basis.

As explained during the rulemaking process for Rule G-18, the rule is generally substantively consistent with FINRA Rule 5310, with specific tailoring to the characteristics of the municipal securities market. This substantive consistency is in recognition of the efficiencies to be gained from harmonized regulation in similar areas of the fixed income markets. Significantly, the core standard of reasonable diligence in Rule G‑18(a) is stated in identical terms to the core standard in FINRA Rule 5310; however, portions of the list of factors that are considered in determining whether a firm has used reasonable diligence are different. As a result, and also in the interests of harmonized regulation, steps by a dealer that meet the reasonable diligence standard under FINRA Rule 5310 generally will be considered to meet the reasonable diligence standard under Rule G-18 in circumstances that are substantially the same. However, dealers should consider whether any additional or different steps may need to be taken to address provisions in Rule G-18 that are tailored specifically for transactions in municipal securities.

(November 20, 2015) 

I.2: Best Price

Q: Does the term “best execution” (as it relates to municipal securities) mean every trade at a particular point in time must match the best price to have occurred within a short time thereafter?

A: As stated in paragraph .01 of the Supplementary Material to MSRB Rule G-18, “[t]he principal purpose of [the] rule is to promote, for customer transactions, dealers’ use of reasonable diligence,” and a “failure to have actually obtained the most favorable price possible will not necessarily mean that the dealer failed to use reasonable diligence.” A trade occurring shortly after a transaction at a materially more favorable price with no significant change in market conditions or the credit worthiness of the security, however, could indicate a lack of reasonable diligence on the part of the dealer or the utilization of inadequate procedures. Such occurrences would suggest that dealers should consider, as part of their periodic review of their procedures, the inclusion of additional markets when handling future customer orders or inquiries.

(November 20, 2015) 

I.3: Documentation

Q: How do dealers document reasonable diligence in compliance with the best-execution standard and does documentation need to be made for each and every transaction?

A: The issue of documentation of dealers’ compliance with MSRB Rule G-18 arises in at least three areas. First, the rule requires dealers to have written policies and procedures for compliance with the rule. Second, dealers should consider documenting their periodic reviews of their written policies and procedures and the results of those reviews. Third, dealers should consider documenting their adherence to their policies and procedures generally, and paragraph .06 of the Supplementary Material specifically requires documentation of compliance with their policies and procedures with respect to securities with limited quotations or pricing information.[7] The documentation dealers should consider in the third area necessarily would depend on the content of the policies and procedures that the dealer determines to adopt. Only by way of example, recognizing this dependence on the content of the policies and procedures, a dealer could use records providing information displayed on an alternative trading system and reviewed by a trader prior to execution, records of periodic observation of traders, notations by traders and/or records of pre- and/or post-trade reviews.[8] However, these are, again, only examples of documentation methods, and Rule G-18 is designed to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate the diverse population of dealers, which can adopt policies and procedures to be reasonably related to the nature of their business, including the level of sales and trading activity and the type of customer transactions at issue, and to allow dealers to demonstrate that they had used reasonable diligence in a manner that is different than that used by other dealers. Given this flexibility, some firms may choose to document their adherence to their policies and procedures on a transaction-by-transaction basis, but the MSRB recognizes that there may be reasonable alternative approaches that would satisfy the requirements of MSRB rules and be sufficient to demonstrate compliance.

(November 20, 2015) 

I.4: Extreme Market Conditions

Q: How do extreme market conditions affect dealers’ best-execution obligations?

A: In the potential event of extreme market conditions impacting the trading of municipal securities (e.g., a shortage of liquidity and divergent prices during periods of significant ratings changes, interest rate movements or other market-wide events) dealers should consider establishing and implementing procedures that are designed to preserve the continued execution of customers’ orders in a manner that is consistent with their best-execution obligations while also recognizing and limiting their exposure to extraordinary market risk. Dealers should consider the following guidelines when evaluating their best-execution procedures during extreme market conditions: 

• The treatment of customer orders must remain fair, consistent and reasonable.

• To the extent that a dealer’s order-handling procedures are different during extreme market conditions, it should disclose to its customers the differences in the procedures from normal market conditions and the circumstances in which it may generally activate these procedures.[9]

• Activation of procedures designed to respond to extreme market conditions may be implemented only when warranted by market conditions. Excessive activation of modified procedures on the grounds of extreme market conditions could raise best-execution concerns. Accordingly, dealers should document the basis for activation of their modified procedures. 

Ultimately, it necessarily involves a facts and circumstances analysis to determine whether actions taken by dealers during extreme market conditions are consistent with the duty of best execution, but the MSRB recognizes that market conditions are an important factor in dealers’ best-execution determinations.

(November 20, 2015)

II. Best-Execution Standard – Applicability

II.1: Applicability to Introducing Dealers

Q: Do introducing dealers that execute and clear trades through other dealers have best-execution obligations to their customers?

A: Yes. MSRB Rule G-18 applies to any transaction in a municipal security for or with a customer or a customer of another dealer, without any exception for orders that are routed to another dealer. Paragraph .08(b) of the Supplementary Material to the rule, however, provides that “[a] dealer that routes its customers’ transactions to another dealer that has agreed to handle those transactions as agent or riskless principal for the customer (e.g., a clearing firm or other executing dealer) may rely on that other dealer’s periodic reviews [of its written policies and procedures] as long as the results and rationale of the review are fully disclosed to the dealer and the dealer periodically reviews how the other dealer’s review is conducted and the results of the review.” Under this provision, introducing dealers may rely on the best-execution policies and procedures of their clearing firms or other executing dealers, all of which are subject to their own best-execution obligations under the rule. An introducing dealer, however, is not relieved of its obligations to establish written policies and procedures of its own. For example, such an introducing dealer’s policies and procedures could provide for the reliance on another dealer’s policies and procedures and periodic reviews by the introducing dealer of the other dealer’s reviews of its policies and procedures.

(November 20, 2015) 

II.2: Inter-Dealer Trades

Q: Do trades between broker-dealers have to comply with the best-execution standard?

A: No. MSRB Rule G-18 applies to any transaction for or with a customer or a customer of another dealer. Paragraph .05 of the Supplementary Material to Rule G-18 provides that “[a] dealer’s duty to provide best execution in any transaction ‘for or with’ ‘a customer of another dealer’ does not apply in instances when the other dealer is simply executing a customer transaction against the dealer’s quote,”... and “[a] dealer’s duty to provide best execution to customer orders received from other dealers arises only when an order is routed from another dealer to the dealer for handling and execution.”

(November 20, 2015)

III. Reasonable Diligence Factors – Number of Markets Checked 

III.1: General

Q: When effecting a customer transaction in municipal securities, how many dealers and/or markets does a dealer need to check, and how much diligence does a dealer need to conduct in order to have confidence that all appropriate dealers and/or markets are included? 

A: The duty of best execution requires a dealer to use reasonable diligence. It does not require a dealer to access every available market, especially given the differences in pricing information and execution functionality offered, and there is no set number of dealers making an offer or collecting bids on behalf of a customer order, or other markets, to check that categorically qualifies as reasonable diligence for compliance with the best-execution obligation. Accordingly, a dealer does not need to post a bid-wanted simultaneously on multiple fixed income alternative trading systems (ATSs) and/or with multiple broker’s brokers, though this may be warranted in some cases, or become a subscriber to every ATS. However, in general, dealers should check more than one market or expose customer orders to multiple offerings or bids, and show external offerings and bids to retail customers, which may be accomplished by the use of ATSs or broker’s brokers that expose orders to multiple dealers, each of which constitutes a “market,” as that term is broadly defined in paragraph .04 of the Supplementary Material.[10] For example, a dealer’s policies and procedures could require that, after receiving offers or bids, the dealer must evaluate the offer or bid price versus relevant market information to determine whether any additional markets, including, but not limited to, other dealers, should be checked to perform reasonable diligence. Each dealer should consider including in its written policies and procedures how and when its trading desk exposes retail customer orders to multiple offerings or bids and shows external offerings and bids to retail customers (directly or through financial advisors). Some dealers may employ “filters,” which generally refer to automated tools that allow the dealer to limit its trading, with, for example, specific parties or parties with specified attributes with which it does not want to interact. If a dealer uses filters on counterparties or filters on specific securities intended to limit accessing bids or offers in those securities, they may be used only for a legitimate purpose consistent with obtaining the most favorable executions for non-SMMP customers, and should be reviewed on a periodic basis and adjusted as needed. The dealer, accordingly, should have policies and procedures in place that govern when and how to: reasonably use filters without negatively impacting the quality of execution of non-SMMP customer transactions; periodically reevaluate their use; and determine whether to lift them upon request.[11]  

Given that the rule is designed, in part, to promote fair competition among dealers, generally, a dealer’s policies and procedures should facilitate competition for its customer order flow, including by eliminating practices that discourage other dealers from offering (bidding on) securities to (from) its clients. However, exposing customer order flow to other dealers, alone, is not sufficient to satisfy reasonable diligence, and dealers must also consider the non-exhaustive list of factors identified in Rule G‑18(a).  

(November 20, 2015)

(Updated February 7, 2019)

III.2: Use of Broker’s Brokers and ATSs

Q: Under what circumstances must a dealer use a broker’s broker or ATS to demonstrate reasonable diligence in ascertaining the best market? 

A: There is no categorical requirement in MSRB Rule G-18 for dealers to use a broker’s broker or an ATS, and the rule is designed specifically not to favor any particular type of venue over another for dealers to meet their best-execution obligations. Paragraph .04 of the Supplementary Material construes the term “market” broadly for purposes of Rule G-18, including the rule’s core provision, section (a), requiring the exercise of reasonable diligence in ascertaining the “best market” for the security. Paragraph .04 of the Supplementary Material states: “This expansive interpretation is meant both to inform dealers as to the breadth of the scope of venues that must be considered in the furtherance of their best-execution obligations and to promote fair competition among dealers (including broker’s brokers), alternative trading systems and platforms, and any other venue that may emerge, by not mandating that certain trading venues have less relevance than others in the course of determining a dealer’s best-execution obligations.” A principal purpose of this broad and even-handed language is to tailor the definition of the critical term “market” to the characteristics of the municipal securities market and provide flexibility for future developments in both market structure and applied technology. For example, the language expressly recognizes a characteristic of the municipal securities market (i.e., the role of dealer inventories in providing liquidity) by providing that the executing dealer itself, acting in a principal capacity, may be the best market for the security. Additionally, while an ATS or a broker’s broker, individually, can be considered a market, each can also be a mechanism to expose customer orders to multiple dealers and, therefore, multiple markets. 

As the availability of electronic systems that facilitate trading in municipal securities increases, dealers need to determine whether these systems might provide benefits to their customer order flow, particularly retail order flow, and help ensure they are meeting their obligations under Rule G-18(a) with respect to ascertaining the best market for their customer transactions. Similarly, pre-trade transparency, such as through electronic trading platforms, is also increasing in the municipal securities market, and dealers need to periodically analyze and determine whether incorporating pricing information available from these systems should be incorporated into their best-execution policies and procedures. 

The MSRB recognizes that different markets provide different levels of price information and execution functionality, and that a dealer’s analysis of the available pricing information offered by different systems may take these differences into account. Some systems, including auto-execution systems, both display prices and provide execution functionality, while other systems display prices but provide no execution functionality. Still other systems, such as request-for-quotation systems, may provide indications of interest but not display prices or provide execution functionality. As such, it is the dealers’ responsibility to evaluate various markets (e.g., ATSs, inter-dealer brokers, other dealers) and to establish and periodically review reasonably designed written policies and procedures addressing when and how certain markets should be checked to satisfy the requirements of the rule. Pursuant to paragraph .08(a) of the Supplementary Material, “[i]n conducting its periodic reviews, a dealer must assess whether its policies and procedures are reasonably designed to achieve best execution, taking into account the quality of the executions the dealer is obtaining under its current policies and procedures, changes in market structure, new entrants, the availability of additional pre-trade and post-trade data, and the availability of new technologies, and to make promptly any necessary modification(s) to such policies and procedures as may be appropriate in light of such reviews.” As an aspect of this periodic review, dealers should review the execution quality provided by the various markets they choose to use (including the internalization of order flow), and, to the extent information is reasonably available, the execution quality of new markets or markets they do not use to determine whether to use them.[12] This review could include, for example, reviewing EMMA^® data for previous executions in the subject security or similar securities. 

Additionally, Rule G-18(a) provides a non-exhaustive list of factors that will be considered in determining whether a dealer has used reasonable diligence, with no single factor being determinative, including: (1) the character of the market for the security (e.g., price, volatility and relative liquidity); (2) the size and type of transaction; (3) the number of markets checked; (4) the information reviewed to determine the current market for the subject security or similar securities; (5) the accessibility of quotations; and (6) the terms and conditions of the customer’s inquiry or order, including any bids or offers, that result in the transaction, as communicated to the dealer. Accordingly, a dealer’s policies and procedures for best execution should address how these factors will affect the dealer’s municipal securities transactions with customers under various conditions. 

(November 20, 2015)

(Updated February 7, 2019)

III.3: Reliance on Broker’s Brokers for Pricing

Q: Is a dealer in compliance with MSRB Rule G-18 if it uses the best bid or offer obtained by a broker’s broker as the only basis for the price at which the dealer executes a customer order? 

A: Use of the best bid or offer obtained by a broker’s broker for a particular security as the only basis for the price at which a dealer executes a customer order will not qualify categorically as reasonable diligence in compliance with Rule G-18. To the extent a dealer uses such practice alone, the dealer’s policies and procedures should establish what facts and circumstances should be considered to allow the dealer to do so (e.g., length of collection period used, number of offers/bids received, accessibility of quotations). 

(November 20, 2015) 

III.4: One ATS/Broker’s Broker

Q: Can a dealer comply with MSRB Rule G-18 by exposing customer orders to an ATS or broker’s broker that captures offers/bids from multiple markets? 

A: The market for municipal securities has evolved significantly in recent years. Some dealers have reduced their inventory positions in response to market and regulatory influences and the use of electronic trading systems, including ATSs, continues to grow. In addition, transaction prices for most municipal securities are now widely available to market participants and investors. Although the amount of pre-trade pricing information (e.g., bids and offers) available also has increased, it is still relatively limited as compared to equity securities and generally not readily accessible by the investing public. While new technology and communications in the municipal securities market have advanced, the market remains decentralized, with much trading still occurring primarily through individual dealers.  

In light of this evolution of the municipal securities market, the MSRB encourages the use of broker’s brokers, ATSs and other markets that typically provide exposure to offers/bids from multiple dealers, each of which could constitute a separate market, and it recognizes there may be facts and circumstances under which it may be sufficient for a dealer to check only one such market and satisfy the best-execution obligation. However, utilizing one ATS, one broker’s broker or other similar market will not qualify categorically as reasonable diligence in compliance with Rule G-18. To the extent a dealer checks only one ATS, broker’s broker or other similar market when executing customer orders, the dealer’s policies and procedures should establish what facts and circumstances may allow for the checking of only one such market (e.g., competitiveness of the ATS; the number of dealers, offerings or bids an order is generally exposed to through the ATS or broker’s broker; accessibility of quotations) and what steps would be required to be taken in those situations. 

(November 20, 2015) 

(Updated February 7, 2019)

III.5: Only One Market

Q: How does the best-execution obligation apply when there is only one dealer (i.e., only one market) offering or bidding on the subject security? 

A: There is no set number of dealers making an offer or collecting bids on behalf of a customer order the checking of which categorically qualifies as reasonable diligence for compliance with the best-execution obligation, and, in general, dealers’ procedures should provide for the checking of more than one market or the exposure of customer orders to multiple offers or bids (e.g., use of an ATS or broker’s broker). However, the MSRB recognizes there may be facts and circumstances under which it may be sufficient for a dealer to check only one market, including internal inventory only, and satisfy the best-execution obligation. In order to comply with the best-execution obligation, each dealer’s written policies and procedures should address such facts and circumstances and the steps required to be taken in those scenarios. At a minimum, dealers must also consider the other factors identified in MSRB Rule G-18(a), including, but not limited to, information to determine the current market for the subject security (e.g., recent trade history) and information on similar securities (e.g., offerings of similar securities). If a dealer has policies and procedures in place that are reasonably designed and otherwise comply with applicable rules and follows them, it could execute an order for which there is only one available market, as long as such handling and execution also are consistent with the terms of the customer’s order or inquiry as communicated to the dealer. 

(November 20, 2015)

IV. Reasonable Diligence Factors – Information Reviewed to Determine the Current Market for the Subject Security or Similar Securities 

IV.1: Similar Securities

Q: What constitutes a similar security? 

A: The municipal securities market differs significantly from the market for equity securities and options and also can vary significantly depending on the specific municipal security at issue. For example, some municipal securities may trade frequently, be relatively more liquid and have transparent, accessible and firm quotations available. Other municipal securities do not have public quotations or frequent pricing information available, and may trade infrequently; however, some municipal securities that are less liquid also are fungible, meaning that they trade like other, similar securities, and the pricing in these similar securities can be used as a basis for determining prices in a subject security.   

Given the wide variety of municipal securities, it is impracticable for the MSRB to provide an exhaustive list of characteristics that qualify a bond as a “similar security” for purposes of MSRB Rule G-18. By way of example, however, issuer, source of repayment, credit rating, coupon, maturity, redemption features, sector, geographical region and tax status are some factors a dealer could use to identify municipal bonds as similar. If a dealer uses a similar securities analysis, its written policies and procedures should establish how the dealer identifies similar securities, as well as how and when to consider the market for them for the purposes of complying with the best-execution rule. 

(November 20, 2015) 

IV.2: Trade Review

Q: In the absence of a market and the absence of previous trade history with other dealers in the subject security, how should dealers use reasonable diligence in compliance with their best-execution obligations? 

A: The MSRB encourages dealers to incorporate pre- and/or post-trade review(s) into their written policies and procedures for compliance with MSRB Rule G-18, but Rule G-18 does not mandate any specific trade review process and the MSRB recognizes that multiple approaches to trade reviews could satisfy a dealer’s best-execution obligations. Rule G-18 is designed to provide sufficient flexibility to accommodate the diverse population of dealers, which can adopt policies and procedures to be reasonably related to the nature of their business, including the level of sales and trading activity and the type of customer transactions at issue, and to allow dealers to evidence that they have used reasonable diligence in compliance with the rule in a manner different than that used by other dealers. Accordingly, dealers can use a variety of data, such as comparisons to similar securities, internal models for assessing the quality of execution or potential execution and/or other tools or measurements of quality of execution, as part of their policies and procedures for best execution or the evaluation thereof. To fully inform themselves when determining what procedures to use for customer transactions, dealers should consider what procedures they use or would use for executing the same or similar transactions for their own accounts, although such procedures are not absolutely required to be the same. 

(November 20, 2015) 

IV.3: Evaluated Pricing

Q: Can dealers use evaluated pricing as a component of their procedures to comply with the best-execution obligation? 

A: Yes. MSRB Rule G-18(a) requires dealers to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for the subject security and to buy or sell in that market so that the resultant price to the customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing market conditions. Section (a) includes a non-exhaustive list of factors that a dealer must consider when exercising this diligence, including the information reviewed to determine the current market for the subject security or similar securities. Accordingly, dealers can use a variety of data, which is not required to include, but can include, evaluated pricing as part of their written policies and procedures for best execution or the evaluation of their policies and procedures; however, such use would not categorically make those policies and procedures sufficient for compliance with Rule G-18. 

(November 20, 2015)

V. Maintenance of Adequate Resources 

V.1: Appropriate Level of Resources

Q: How does a firm establish that it has the appropriate level of resources? 

A: Paragraph .02 of the Supplementary Material to MSRB Rule G-18 states that “[a] dealer’s failure to maintain adequate resources (e.g., staff or technology) is not a justification for executing away from the best available market.” Additionally, paragraph .02 states that “[t]he level of resources that a dealer maintains should take into account the nature of the dealer’s municipal securities business, including its level of sales and trading activity.” This provision was designed to provide flexibility to accommodate the diverse population of dealers. Accordingly, an appropriate level of resources will depend on many factors, including, but not limited to, a firm’s amount of business, and dealers need to employ enough resources to assure that they can establish, implement, follow and periodically review and improve written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve best execution. 

(November 20, 2015)

VI. Securities with Limited Quotations or Pricing Information 

VI.1: Execution Timing

Q: Are there municipal bonds that require more time for a dealer to use reasonable diligence when effecting a customer transaction, and how does a dealer demonstrate such diligence? 

A: Paragraph .03 of the Supplementary Material to MSRB Rule G-18 requires dealers to make every effort to execute a customer transaction promptly, taking into account prevailing market conditions. Taking a relatively shorter time can suggest a lack of reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market, while taking a relatively longer time can suggest a failure to execute promptly. There is no specific amount of time that is too short or too long to effect a customer transaction; it necessarily will depend on the particular facts and circumstances. Paragraph .03, which is tailored for the municipal securities market and varies from the language of FINRA Rule 5310, therefore, goes on to recognize that, in certain market conditions, dealers may need more time to use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for the subject security. This provision clarifies that a dealer should not be considered to have failed to execute promptly in market conditions that are beyond the dealer’s control that cause reasonable diligence to be more time-consuming. This provision, at the same time, is designed to temper the promptness requirement so that it does not undermine the goal of the rule to promote reasonable diligence. By way of example, such market conditions could be illiquidity or infrequent trading of the subject security, low demand for lower-rated bonds, low demand for distressed bonds and low demand for bonds with uncommon structural characteristics.  

The absence or limitation of accessible quotations or pricing information is not uncommon for many municipal securities, but does not relieve a dealer of its best-execution obligations. Indeed, paragraph .06 of the Supplementary Material to Rule G-18 specifically requires dealers to have written policies and procedures in place that address how the dealer will make its best-execution determinations with respect to securities with limited quotations or pricing information and to document its compliance with those policies and procedures. Such policies and procedures could establish what bonds/market conditions are subject to any variance in the dealer’s other order-handling procedures, including establishing what it means to have limited quotations or pricing information, what additional procedures, if any, are required to be followed by dealer personnel, and how such steps are to be documented. For example, these securities may require dealers to take additional steps in order to satisfy the best-execution standard, including, but not limited to, seeking out other sources of pricing information and potential liquidity, including, but not limited to, directly contacting dealers with which they previously have traded the security or that are otherwise known to trade in the security.

The MSRB recognizes that, in some instances, obtaining quotations from multiple markets could adversely affect execution quality due to delays in execution or other factors.[13] Therefore, a dealer generally should analyze other data to which it reasonably has access to determine whether it has ascertained the best market for the subject security, but its policies and procedures should also establish under what facts and circumstances it would be appropriate to obtain quotations or other pricing information from multiple markets. Additionally, if pricing information related to the subject security, such as a dealer’s previous trades in the security, or other pricing information, such as a quotation from another market, is limited or unavailable, a dealer may also consider previous trades in a similar security, if that security and those previous trades constitute a reasonable basis for comparison. As with all policies and procedures related to best execution, paragraph .08 of the Supplementary Material to Rule G-18 requires dealers to periodically review these specific policies and procedures, assess whether they are reasonably designed to achieve best execution, and make promptly any necessary modifications in light of such reviews. 

(November 20, 2015)

VII. Relationship To Fair Pricing 

VII.1: MSRB Rule G-30

Q: How does MSRB Rule G-18, on best execution, relate to MSRB Rule G-30, on prices and commissions? 

A: Rule G-18 is intended to complement, support and foster compliance with the MSRB’s established substantive pricing standards, which are governed by Rule G-30, by improving execution quality for customers and promoting fair competition among dealers resulting in increased market efficiency. However, the rule makes clear that its obligations are distinct from, for example, the fairness and reasonableness of commissions, markups or markdowns.  

Rule G-30 requires dealers to trade with customers at fair and reasonable prices, and to exercise diligence in establishing the market value of municipal securities and the reasonableness of their compensation. Rule G-18, on the other hand, does not contain any substantive pricing standard; it is an order-handling and transaction-execution standard, under which the goal of the dealer’s reasonable diligence is to provide the customer the most favorable price possible under prevailing market conditions. Paragraph .01 of the Supplementary Material makes explicit that Rule G-18 is not an absolute “best-price” standard. The rule requires dealers to exercise reasonable diligence with the goal of obtaining the most favorable price possible under prevailing market conditions, which is accomplished through the use and periodic improvement of policies and procedures; it does not require the dealer to actually obtain the most favorable price possible in each transaction (although it frequently will do so through the use of reasonable diligence), and a failure to obtain the most favorable price possible in a transaction will not necessarily mean that the dealer failed to use reasonable diligence under the circumstances.  

Despite the different purposes of Rules G-18 and G-30, some of the relevant factors in determining the fairness and reasonableness of prices and commissions or service charges, such as the availability of the securities and the nature of the dealer’s business, may also be relevant to the application of the best-execution requirement. Further, although the best-execution rule does not itself contain any substantive standard by which the transaction price itself is to be or could be evaluated, the requirement to use reasonable diligence in the order-handling and transaction-execution process is expected to increase the probability that customers receive fair-and-reasonable prices.  

(November 20, 2015)

VIII. SMMP Eexemption – General 

VIII.1: Qualification

Q:  Does the best-execution obligation apply to all customer transactions? 

A: No. However, the only variance in the requirements of MSRB Rule G-18, according to the characteristics of the customer, is codified in MSRB Rules G-48 and D-15 in the form of the SMMP exemption. Section (e) of Rule G-48, which is the consolidated MSRB rule under which all modified obligations of dealers when dealing with SMMPs are addressed, provides that the best-execution obligation under Rule G-18 does not apply to transactions with customers that are SMMPs as defined in Rule D-15.  

(November 20, 2015) 

VIII.2: Applicability to Non-Recommended Transactions

Q: Will the SMMP exemption from the best-execution rule apply to non-recommended transactions? 

A: Yes. The applicability of the SMMP exemption to MSRB Rule G-18 is triggered by a customer’s status as an SMMP, not whether or not a transaction is recommended by the dealer. However, the applicability of the exemption for any particular SMMP is controlled by the scope of the customer affirmation required by MSRB Rule D-15(c) and provided to the dealer. Specifically, paragraph .02 of the Supplementary Material to Rule D-15 provides that “[t]he customer affirmation may be given either orally or in writing, and may be given on a trade-by-trade basis, a type-of-transaction basis, a type-of-municipal-security basis (e.g., general obligation, revenue, variable rate), or an account-wide basis.” As such, any transaction not covered by a customer’s affirmation would remain subject to the best-execution obligation. 

(November 20, 2015) 

VIII.3: Applicability to Transactions with Other Broker-Dealers

Q: Do dealers need to rely on the SMMP exemption to be relieved of the best-execution obligation for transactions for or with broker-dealer clients? 

A: No. MSRB Rule G-18’s best-execution obligation only applies to transactions for or with a customer or a customer of another dealer, and the MSRB’s definition of “customer” in Rule D-9 does not include broker-dealers acting in their capacity as broker-dealers.[14] Accordingly, there is no need for dealers to rely on the SMMP exemption when executing transactions for or with other broker-dealers, and, therefore, no need for customer affirmations for those broker-dealers to qualify as SMMPs. 

(November 20, 2015) 

VIII.4: Existing Customer Affirmations

Q: Can dealers rely on customer affirmations based on existing MSRB Rule D-15? 

A: No. As of the effective date of MSRB Rule G-18 and the amendments to MSRB Rules G-48 and D-15, a customer will not qualify as an SMMP unless it makes the broader affirmation required by Rule D-15, as amended, which addresses all of the modified dealer obligations provided in Rule G-48, including the exemption from the best-execution obligation. Accordingly, any customer affirmations based on existing Rule D-15 would be ineffective to qualify for the SMMP exemption. 

(November 20, 2015) 

VIII.5: Piecemeal Customer Affirmations and Waiver of Dealer Obligations

Q: Can an SMMP waive time-of-trade disclosures, but still have its trades subject to the best-execution rule? 

A: No. A customer cannot waive, and a dealer is not exempt from the time-of-trade disclosure obligation, unless the customer qualifies as an SMMP.[15] In order to qualify as an SMMP, the customer’s affirmation, according to MSRB Rule D-15, must be unified and speak to all of the modified dealer obligations provided in MSRB Rule G-48, including the modified obligations with respect to both time-of-trade disclosure and best execution. The MSRB has determined that, if a customer is not prepared to forgo all of the legal protections afforded by the dealer obligations that would be modified under Rule G-48 if they were an SMMP, then the customer likely does not have the sophistication necessary to qualify as an SMMP. However, the exemption from the best-execution obligation provided by Rules G-48 and D-15 does not preclude a dealer from following its best-execution policies and procedures when handling SMMP orders. 

(November 20, 2015) 

VIII.6: Customer Affirmation Updates

Q: If a dealer reasonably concludes a customer is an SMMP, is the initial affirmation sufficient for all future trades for that customer, or is there a periodic update requirement for customer affirmations? 

A: Although there is no explicit periodic update requirement for customer affirmations, MSRB Rule G‑48 requires that dealers “reasonably conclude” a customer is an SMMP. After a certain lapse of time, it will become unreasonable for the dealer to continue to rely on the stale affirmation, and the dealer, therefore, could no longer “reasonably conclude,” as required, that the customer is an SMMP. 

(November 20, 2015) 

VIII.7: FINRA Rule 2111

Q: Will an institutional investor’s suitability form/letter in compliance with FINRA Rule 2111 satisfy the affirmation requirement to qualify as an SMMP pursuant to MSRB Rule D-15? 

A: No. FINRA Rule 2111(b) and paragraph .07 of the Supplementary Material thereto provide that one element of the suitability obligation of member firms under that rule is fulfilled if the institution affirmatively indicates that it is exercising independent judgment in evaluating the member's or associated person's recommendations. This is similar to the existing exemption dealers have from the suitability requirement of MSRB Rule G-19 under MSRB Rule G-48(c). But neither FINRA Rule 2111 nor any other FINRA rule provides a similar exemption from best execution or any other obligations for its member firms comparable to those included in Rule G-48. Accordingly, a suitability form/letter limited in its terms to comply with FINRA Rule 2111 would not address the full scope of obligations that dealers would be relieved of fulfilling under the exemptions provided by Rules G-48 and D-15. Therefore, a customer will not qualify as an SMMP unless it makes the affirmation required by Rule D-15, which does address all of the modified dealer obligations provided in Rule G-48.

(November 20, 2015)

Introduction 

In view of the important role that broker’s brokers play in the provision of secondary market liquidity for municipal securities owned by retail investors, MSRB Rule G-43 sets forth particular rules to which broker’s brokers are subject.  Rule G-43(a)(i) provides:

Each dealer acting as a "broker’s broker"[1] with respect to the execution of a transaction in municipal securities for or on behalf of another dealer shall make a reasonable effort to obtain a price for the dealer that is fair and reasonable in relation to prevailing market conditions.  The broker’s broker must employ the same care and diligence in doing so as if the transaction were being done for its own account.[2]

In guidance on broker’s brokers issued in 2004,[3] the MSRB noted the role of some broker’s brokers in large intra-day price differentials of infrequently traded municipal securities with credits that were relatively unknown to most market participants, especially in the case of “retail” size blocks of $5,000 to $100,000.  In certain cases, differences between the prices received by the selling customers as a result of a broker’s broker bid-wanted and the prices paid by the ultimate purchasing customers on the same day were 10% or more.  After the securities were purchased from the broker’s broker, they were sold to other dealers in a series of transactions until they eventually were purchased by other customers.  The abnormally large intra-day price differentials were attributed in major part to the price increases found in the inter-dealer market occurring after the broker’s brokers’ trades.

Rule G-43 addresses the role of broker’s brokers, including their role in such a series of transactions.  It is the role of the broker’s broker to conduct a properly run bid-wanted or offering and thereby satisfy its duty to make a reasonable effort to obtain a price for the dealer that is fair and reasonable in relation to prevailing market conditions.  The MSRB believes that a bid-wanted or offering conducted in the manner provided in Rule G-43 will be an important element in the establishment of a fair and reasonable price for municipal securities in the secondary market.  This notice addresses the roles of other transaction participants, specifically the brokers, dealers, and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) that sell, and bid for, municipal securities in bid-wanteds and offerings conducted by broker’s brokers.  Those selling dealers (“sellers”) and bidding dealers (“bidders”) also have pricing duties under MSRB rules and their failure to satisfy those duties could negate the reasonable efforts of a broker’s broker to achieve fair pricing.

Duties of Bidders

Rule G-13(b)(i) provides that, in general, “no broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer shall distribute or publish, or cause to be distributed or published, any quotation relating to municipal securities, unless the quotation represents a bona fide bid[4] for, or offer of, municipal securities by such broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer.”  Rule G-13(b)(ii) provides that “[n]o broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer shall distribute or publish, or cause to be distributed or published, any quotation relating to municipal securities, unless the price stated in the quotation is based on the best judgment of such broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer of the fair market value of the securities which are the subject of the quotation at the time the quotation is made.”

Dealers that submit bids to broker’s brokers that they believe are below the fair market value of the securities or that submit “throw-away” bids to broker’s brokers do so in violation of Rule G-13.  While bidders are entitled to make a profit, Rule G-13 does not permit them to do so by “picking off” other dealers at off-market prices.  Throw-away bids, by definition, violate Rule G-13, because throw-away bids are arrived at without an analysis by the bidder of the fair market value of the municipal security that is the subject of the bid.  A conclusion by the bidder that a security must be worth “at least that much,” without any knowledge of the security or comparable securities and without any effort to analyze the security’s value is not based on the best judgment of such bidder of the fair market value of the securities within the meaning of Rule G-13(b)(ii).  When the MSRB first proposed Rule G-13, it explained in a February 24, 1977 letter from Frieda Wallison, Executive Director and General Counsel, MSRB, to Lee Pickard, Director, Division of Market Regulation, Securities and Exchange Commission that, among the activities that Rule G-13 was designed to prevent was the placing of a bid that is “pulled out of the air,” which is another way to describe a throw-away bid.

Furthermore, when a dealer’s bid is accepted and a transaction in the securities is executed, that transaction price (and accordingly the bid itself) will be disseminated within the meaning of Rule G-13(a)(i) on the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access (EMMA®) platform within 15 minutes after the time of trade.  At that point, if the bid is off-market, it will create a misperception in the municipal marketplace of the true fair market value of the security.  The fact that the bid price that wins a bid-wanted or offering may well not represent the true fair market value of the security is evidenced by the trade activity observed by enforcement agencies following such auctions.  Enforcement agencies have informed the MSRB that they continue to observe the same kinds of series of transactions in municipal securities that prompted the MSRB’s 2004 pricing guidance.  They have also informed the MSRB about their observations of other trading patterns that indicate some market participants may misuse the role of the broker’s broker in the provision of secondary market liquidity and may cause retail customers who liquidate their municipal securities by means of broker’s brokers to receive unfair prices.

Duties of Sellers

Dealers that use the services of broker’s brokers to sell municipal securities for their customers also have significant fair pricing duties under Rule G-30 when they act as a principal.  As the MSRB noted in its request for comment on Draft Rule G-43,[5]

the information about the value of municipal securities provided to a selling dealer by a broker’s broker is only one factor that the dealer must take into account in determining a fair and reasonable price for its customer.  In fact, in 2004, the National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”) announced that it had fined eight dealers for relying solely on prices obtained in bid-wanteds conducted by broker’s brokers, which the NASD found to be significantly below fair market value.[6]  In that same year, the MSRB said that “particularly when the market value of an issue is not known, a dealer . . . may need to check the results of the bid wanted process against other objective data to fulfill its fair pricing obligations . . . .”

Under those circumstances where broker’s brokers seeks to satisfy their fair pricing obligations in bid-wanteds conducted pursuant to Rule G-43(b), Rule G-43(b)(v) provides for notice by broker’s brokers to sellers when bids in bid-wanteds are below predetermined parameters that are designed to identify possible off-market bids (e.g., those based on yield curves, pricing services, recent trades reported to the MSRB’s RTRS System, or bids received by broker’s brokers in prior bid-wanteds or offerings).  Once a seller has received such notice, it must direct the broker’s broker as to whether to execute the trade at that price.  That notice by the broker’s broker and required action on the part of the seller should put the seller on notice that it must take additional steps to ascertain whether the high bid provided to it by the broker’s broker is, in fact, a fair and reasonable price for the securities.  Rule G-30 mandates that the seller, if acting as a principal, must not buy municipal securities from its customer at a price that is not fair and reasonable (taking any mark-down into account), taking into consideration all relevant factors, including those listed in the rule.

The MSRB notes that Rule G-8(a)(xxv)(E) requires broker’s brokers to keep records when they have provided the seller with the notice described in Rule G-43(b)(v).  Among the required records are the full name of the person at the seller who received the notice, the direction given by the seller firm following the notice, and the full name of the person at the seller who provided that direction.

Rule G-43(b)(i) permits a broker’s broker to limit the audience for a bid-wanted at the selling dealer’s direction, a practice sometimes referred to as “screening” or “filtering,” because the MSRB recognizes that there may be legitimate reasons for this practice.  However, the MSRB notes that such screening may reduce the likelihood that the high bid represents a fair and reasonable price.  Selling dealers should, therefore, be able to demonstrate a reason that is not anti-competitive (e.g., credit, legal, or regulatory concerns), rather than trying to eliminate access by a competitor, for directing broker’s brokers to screen certain bidders from the receipt of bid-wanteds or offerings.  For example, a selling dealer might maintain a list of the firms it would be unwilling to accept as a counterparty and the reasons why.

The MSRB recognizes that there may be circumstances under which customers may need to liquidate their municipal securities quickly and that there are limitations on the ability of a bid-wanted or offering to achieve a price that is comparable to recent trade prices under certain circumstances, particularly in view of its timing and the presence or absence of regular buyers in the marketplace.  Nevertheless, the MSRB urges sellers not to assume that their customers need to liquidate their securities immediately without inquiring as to their customers’ particular circumstances and discussing with their customers the possible improved pricing benefit associated with taking additional time to liquidate the securities.

Rule G-17 requires dealers, in the conduct of their municipal securities activities, to deal fairly with all persons and to not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice.  Broker’s brokers have informed the MSRB that many dealers place bid-wanteds and offerings with broker’s brokers with no intention of selling the securities through the broker’s brokers.  Some have noted that shortly thereafter they see the same securities purchased by dealers for their own accounts at prices that exceed the high bid obtained by the broker’s brokers by only a very small amount.  Other dealers have told the MSRB that they are skeptical of many of the bid-wanteds they see, because they think the bid-wanteds are only being used for price discovery by the selling dealers and are not real.  Accordingly, in many cases, they do not bid.  This use of broker’s brokers solely for price discovery purposes harms the bid-wanted and offering process by reducing bidders, thereby reducing the likelihood that the high bid in a bid-wanted will represent the fair market value of the securities.  Additionally, it causes broker’s brokers to work without reasonable expectation of compensation.  For those reasons, depending upon the facts and circumstances, the use of bid-wanteds solely for price discovery purposes may be an unfair practice within the meaning of Rule G-17.

a quotation shall be deemed to represent a "bona fide bid for, or offer of, municipal securities" if the broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer making the quotation is prepared to purchase or sell the security which is the subject of the quotation at the price stated in the quotation and under such conditions, if any, as are specified at the time the quotation is made.

[5] MSRB Notice 2011-18 (February 24, 2011).

[6] See https://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2004/P011465.

MSRB Rule G-23 establishes certain basic requirements applicable to a broker, dealer, or municipal securities dealer (“dealer”) acting as a financial advisor with respect to the issuance of municipal securities.  MSRB Rule G-23(d) provides that a dealer that has a financial advisory relationship with respect to the issuance of municipal securities is precluded from acquiring all or any portion of such issue, directly or indirectly, from the issuer as principal, either alone or as a participant in a syndicate or other similar account formed for that purpose.  A dealer is also precluded from arranging the placement of an issue with respect to which it has a financial advisory relationship.  This notice refers to both of these activities as “underwritings” and provides interpretive guidance on when a dealer may be precluded by Rule G-23(d) from underwriting an issue of municipal securities due to having served as financial advisor with respect to that issue.  Rule G-23 is solely a conflicts rule.  Accordingly, this notice does not address whether provision of the advice permitted by Rule G-23 would cause the dealer to be considered a “municipal advisor” under the Exchange Act and the rules promulgated thereunder.

Rule G-23(b) provides, among other things, that a financial advisory relationship shall be deemed to exist for purposes of Rule G-23 when a dealer renders or enters into an agreement to provide financial advisory or consultant services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to the issuance of municipal securities, including advice with respect to the structure, timing, terms, and other similar matters concerning such issue or issues.  Rule G-23(b) also provides, however, that a financial advisory relationship shall not be deemed to exist when, in the course of acting as an underwriter and not as a financial advisor, a dealer provides advice to an issuer, including advice with respect to the structure, timing, terms, and other similar matters concerning the issuance of municipal securities.

Although Rule G-23(c) requires a financial advisory relationship to be evidenced by a writing, a financial advisory relationship will be deemed to exist whenever a dealer renders the types of advice provided for in Rule G-23(b), regardless of the existence of a written agreement.  However, a dealer that clearly identifies itself in writing as an underwriter and not as a financial advisor from the earliest stages of its relationship with the issuer with respect to that issue (e.g., in a response to a request for proposals or in promotional materials provided to an issuer) will be considered to be “acting as an underwriter” under Rule G-23(b) with respect to that issue.  The writing must make clear that the primary role of an underwriter is to purchase, or arrange for the placement of, securities in an arm’s-length commercial transaction between the issuer and the underwriter and that the underwriter has financial and other interests that differ from those of the issuer.  The dealer must not engage in a course of conduct that is inconsistent with an arm’s-length relationship with the issuer in connection with such issue of municipal securities or the dealer will be deemed to be a financial advisor with respect to that issue and precluded from underwriting that issue by Rule G-23(d).  Thus, a dealer providing advice to an issuer with respect to the issuance of municipal securities (including the structure, timing, and terms of the issue and other similar matters, when integrally related to the issue being underwritten) will not be viewed as a financial advisor for purposes of Rule G-23, if such advice is rendered in its capacity as underwriter for such issue.  In addition to engaging in underwriting activities, it shall not be a violation of Rule G-23(d) for a dealer that states that it is acting as an underwriter with respect to the issuance of municipal securities to provide advice with respect to the investment of the proceeds of the issue, municipal derivatives integrally related to the issue, or other similar matters concerning the issue.

In 1999, the MSRB published a notice on the application of Rule G-37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business, to Presidential campaigns of issuer officials.[1]  In general, the notice described a 1995 interpretive letter[2] in which the Board noted that Rule G-37 is applicable to contributions given to an official of an issuer[3] who seeks election to federal office, such as the Presidency.  The Board also explained that the only exception to Rule G-37’s absolute prohibition on business is for certain contributions made to issuer officials by municipal finance professionals.  Specifically, contributions by such persons to an official of an issuer would not invoke application of the prohibition if the municipal finance professional is entitled to vote for such official, and provided that any contributions by such municipal finance professional do not exceed, in total, $250 to each official, per election.  In the example of an issuer official running for President, any municipal finance professional in the country can contribute the de minimis amount to the official’s Presidential campaign without causing a ban on municipal securities business with that issuer.  Finally, the Board noted that a Presidential candidate who has accepted public funding for the general election is prohibited under federal law from accepting any contributions to further his or her general election campaign.  In these circumstances, federal law allows individuals to contribute to the candidate’s compliance fund, which uses the contributions solely for legal and accounting services to ensure compliance with federal law and not for campaign activities.  Thus, any municipal finance professional in the country can contribute the de minimis amount to an issuer official’s compliance fund without causing a ban on municipal securities business with that issuer.  This would apply if the issuer official runs for President or Vice President.

The MSRB wishes to remind dealers that these concepts also apply to an issuer official who campaigns for any federal office.  For example, any municipal finance professional residing in a state in which an issuer official is campaigning for a state-wide federal office may contribute the de minimis amount to the official’s campaign without causing a ban on municipal securities business with that issuer.  The MSRB does not opine whether any particular individual is or is not an issuer official. 

The MSRB also wishes to remind dealers to be aware of the Rule G-37 issues involving indirect rule violations and contributions to non-dealer associated political action committees and payments to political parties, which issues have been the subjects of previous notices and interpretive Questions and Answers.[4]

September 28, 2011

[2] See MSRB Interpretation of May 31, 1995, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (January 1, 2011) at 309-311.  The letter is also available from the MSRB Rules/Interpretive Letters section of the MSRB’s website at www.msrb.org.

[3] The term “official of an issuer” is defined in Rule G-37(g)(vi) as any person (including any election committee for such person) who was, at the time of the contribution, an incumbent, candidate or successful candidate: (A) for elective office of the issuer which office is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer for municipal securities business by the issuer; or (B) for any elective office of a state or of any political subdivision, which office has authority to appoint any person who is directly or indirectly responsible for, or can influence the outcome of, the hiring of a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer for municipal securities business by an issuer.

[4] See Notice Concerning Indirect Rule Violations: Rules G-37 and G-38, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (January 1, 2011) at 302-303; Rule G-37 Questions and Answers Nos.  III.4 and III.5 regarding contributions to a non-dealer associated PAC and payments to a state or local political party, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (January 1, 2011) at 290; and Rule G-37 Question and Answer No. III.7 regarding supervisory procedures relating to indirect contributions, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (January 1, 2011) at 291.  The notice and Questions and Answers are also available on the MSRB’s website at www.msrb.org.

Since 1994, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) has sought to eliminate pay-to-play practices in the municipal securities market through its Rule G-37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business.[1]  Under the rule, certain contributions to elected officials of municipal securities issuers made by brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”), municipal finance professionals (“MFPs”) associated with dealers, and political action committees (“PACs”) controlled by dealers and their MFPs (“dealer-controlled PACs”)[2] may result in prohibitions on dealers from engaging in municipal securities business with such issuers for a period of two years from the date of any triggering contributions.

Rule G-37 requires dealers to record and disclose certain contributions to issuer officials, state or local political parties, and bond ballot campaigns, as well as other information, on Form G-37 to allow public scrutiny of such contributions and the municipal securities business of a dealer. In addition, dealers and MFPs generally are prohibited from soliciting others (including affiliates of the dealer or any PACs) to make contributions to officials of issuers with which the dealer is engaging or seeking to engage in municipal securities business, or to political parties of a state or locality where the dealer is engaging or seeking to engage in municipal securities business. Dealers and MFPs also are prohibited from circumventing Rule G-37 by direct or indirect actions through any other persons or means.[3]

Due to changes in the financial markets since the adoption of Rule G-37, many dealers and MFPs have become affiliated with a broad range of other entities in increasingly diverse organizational structures.  Some of these affiliated entities (including but not limited to banks, bank holding companies, insurance companies and investment management companies) have formed or otherwise maintain relationships with PACs (“affiliated PACs”) and other political organizations, many of which may make contributions to issuer officials.  Such relationships raise questions regarding the extent to which affiliated PACs may effectively be controlled by dealers or their MFPs and thereby constitute dealer-controlled PACs whose contributions are subject to Rule G-37.  Further, such relationships raise concerns regarding whether the contributions of such affiliated PACs, even if not viewed as dealer-controlled PACs, may be used by dealers or their MFPs to circumvent Rule G-37 as indirect contributions for the purpose of obtaining or retaining municipal securities business.

The MSRB remains concerned that individuals and firms subject to Rule G-37 may seek ways around the rule through payments to and contributions by affiliated PACs that benefit issuer officials. When evaluating whether contributions made by affiliated PACs may be subject to the provisions of Rule G-37, the MSRB emphasizes that dealers should first determine whether such affiliated PAC would be viewed as a dealer-controlled PAC. If an affiliated PAC is determined to be a dealer-controlled PAC, then its contributions to issuer officials would subject the dealer to the ban on municipal securities business and its contributions to issuer officials, state or local political parties, and bond ballot campaigns would be subject to disclosure under Rule G-37. Even if the affiliated PAC is determined not to be a dealer-controlled PAC, the dealer still must consider whether payments made by the dealer or its MFPs to such affiliated PAC could ultimately be viewed as an indirect contribution under Rule G-37(d) if, for example, the affiliated PAC is being used as a conduit for making a contribution to an issuer official.

The MSRB wishes to provide guidance regarding the factors that may result in an affiliated PAC being viewed as controlled by the dealer or an MFP of the dealer and thereby being treated as a dealer-controlled PAC for purposes of Rule G-37. The MSRB also wishes to ensure that the industry is cognizant of prior MSRB guidance regarding the potential for payments to and contributions by affiliated PACs to constitute indirect contributions under the rule.

Indicators of Control by Dealers and MFPs

Soon after adoption of Rule G-37, the MSRB stated that each dealer must determine whether a PAC is dealer controlled, with any PAC of a non-bank dealer assumed to be a dealer-controlled PAC.[4]  The MSRB has also stated that the determination of whether a PAC of a bank dealer[5] is a dealer-controlled PAC would depend upon whether the bank dealer or anyone from the bank dealer department has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC.[6]  Such ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of a PAC also would be indicative of control of such PAC by a non-bank dealer or any of its MFPs, although it would not be the exclusive indicator of such control. While this guidance establishes basic principles with regard to making a determination of control, it does not set out an exhaustive list of circumstances under which a PAC may or may not be viewed as dealer or MFP controlled.  The specific facts and circumstances regarding the creation, management, operation and control of a particular PAC must be considered in making a determination of control with respect to such PAC.

Creation of PAC. In general, a dealer or MFP involved in the creation of a PAC would continue to be viewed as controlling such PAC unless and until such dealer or MFP becomes wholly disassociated in any direct or indirect manner with the PAC. Thus, any PAC created by a dealer, acting either in a sole capacity or together with other entities or individuals, would be presumed to be a dealer-controlled PAC.  This presumption continues at least as long as the dealer or any MFP of the dealer retains any formal or informal role in connection with such PAC, regardless of whether such dealer or MFP has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. This presumption also would continue for so long as any associated person of the dealer (either an individual, whether or not an MFP, or an affiliated company directly or indirectly controlling, controlled by or under common control with the dealer) has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. In effect, a dealer could not attempt to treat a PAC it created and then spun off to the control of an affiliated company as not being a dealer-controlled PAC. However, depending on the totality of the facts and circumstances, a PAC originally created by a dealer in which the dealer or its MFPs no longer retain any role, and with respect to which any other affiliates retain only very limited non-control roles, could be viewed as no longer controlled by the dealer.

Similarly, a PAC created by any person associated with the dealer at the time the PAC was created, acting either in a sole capacity or together with other entities or individuals, would be presumed to be controlled by such person.  Such presumption continues at least for so long as such person retains any formal or informal role in connection with such PAC, regardless of whether any such person has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC.  This presumption also would continue for so long as any other person associated with the same dealer as the creator of the PAC has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC. Although such PAC may not be viewed as being subject to Rule G-37 as an MFP-controlled PAC when originally created if such person was not then an MFP, if the person creating the PAC, or any other associated person with the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of such PAC, is or later becomes an MFP, such PAC would be deemed an MFP-controlled PAC.[7]

Management, Funding and Control of PAC. Beyond the role of the dealer, MFP or other person in creating a PAC and maintaining an ongoing association with such PAC, the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of a PAC is also important. Strong indicators of management and control are not mitigated by the fact that such dealer, MFP or other person does not have exclusive, predominant or “majority” control of the PAC, its management, its policies, or its decisions with regard to making contributions.  For example, the fact that a dealer or MFP may only have a single vote on a governing board or other decision-making or advisory board or committee of a PAC, and therefore does not have sole power to cause the PAC to take any action, would not obviate the status of such dealer or MFP as having control of the PAC, so long as the dealer or MFP has the ability, alone or in conjunction with other similarly empowered entities or individuals, to direct or cause the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC.  In essence, it is possible for a single PAC to be viewed as controlled by multiple different dealers if the control of such PAC is shared among such dealers, although the presumption of control may be rebutted as described below.

The level of funding provided by dealers and their MFPs to a PAC may also be indicative of control. A PAC that receives a majority of its funding from a single dealer (including the collective contributions of its MFPs and employees) or a single MFP is conclusively presumed to be controlled by such dealer or MFP, regardless of the lack of any of the other indicia of control described in this notice.  Another important factor is the size or frequency of contributions by a dealer or MFP,[8] viewed in light of the size and frequency of contributions made by other contributors not affiliated in any way with such dealer or MFP. For example, a limited number of small contributions freely made by employees of a dealer to an affiliated PAC (i.e., not directed by the dealer and not part of an automated or otherwise dealer-organized program of contributions) would not, by itself, automatically raise a presumption of dealer control so long as the collective contributions by the dealer or its employees is not significant as compared to the total funding of the affiliated PAC, subject to consideration of the other relevant facts and circumstances. In addition, contributions made by a dealer or MFP to an affiliated PAC could raise a stronger inference of de facto dealer or MFP control than when such contributions were made to non-affiliated PACs.

However, even where a dealer or MFP is not viewed as controlling a PAC under the principles described above, dealers should remain mindful of the potential for leveraging the contribution activities of affiliated PACs in soliciting municipal securities business in a way that could raise a presumption of dealer or MFP control.  For example, an MFP’s references to the contributions made by an affiliated PAC during solicitations of municipal securities business could, depending on the facts and circumstances, serve as evidence of coordination of such PAC’s activities with the dealer or MFP that could, together with other facts, be indicative of direct or indirect control of the PAC by such dealer or MFP.  Such control could be found even in circumstances where the dealer or its MFPs have not made contributions to the affiliated PAC.[9]

Of course, the presumptions described above may be rebutted, depending upon the totality of facts and circumstances. Considerations that may serve to rebut such presumptions may include whether the dealer or person creating the PAC:  (i) participates with a broad-based group of other entities and/or individuals in creating the PAC, (ii) at no time undertakes any direct or indirect role (and, in the case of a dealer, no person associated with the dealer undertakes any direct or indirect role) in leading the creation of the PAC or in directing or causing the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC, and/or (iii) provides funding for such PAC (and, in the case of a dealer, its associated persons collectively provide funding for such PAC) that is not substantially greater than the typical funding levels of other participants in the PAC who do not undertake a direct or indirect role in leading the creation of the PAC or in directing or causing the direction of the management or the policies of the PAC.

Indirect Contributions Through Bank PACs or Other Affiliated PACs

As noted above, if an affiliated PAC is determined not to be a dealer-controlled PAC, a dealer must still consider whether payments made by the dealer or its MFPs to such affiliated PAC could be viewed as an indirect contribution that would become subject to Rule G-37 pursuant to section (d) thereof. The MSRB has provided extensive guidance on such indirect contributions, noting in 1996 that, depending on the facts and circumstances, contributions to a non-dealer associated PAC that is soliciting funds for the purpose of supporting a limited number of issuer officials might result in the same prohibition on municipal securities business as would contributions made directly to the issuer official.[10]  The MSRB also noted that dealers should make inquiries of a non-dealer associated PAC that is soliciting contributions in order to ensure that contributions to such a PAC would not be treated as an indirect contribution.[11]

The MSRB also has previously provided guidance in 2005 with regard to supervisory procedures [12] that dealers should have in place in connection with payments to a non-dealer associated PAC or a political party to avoid indirect rule violations of Rule G-37(d).  In such guidance, the MSRB stated that, in order to ensure compliance with Rule G-27(c) as it relates to payments to political parties or PACs and Rule G-37(d), each dealer must adopt, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that neither the dealer nor its MFPs are using payments to political parties or non-dealer controlled PACs to contribute indirectly to an official of an issuer.[13]  Among other things, dealers might seek to establish procedures requiring that, prior to the making of any contribution to a PAC, the dealer undertake certain due diligence inquiries regarding the intended use of such contributions, the motive for making the contribution and whether the contribution was solicited. Further, in order to ensure compliance with Rule G-37(d), dealers could consider establishing certain information barriers between any affiliated PACs and the dealer and its MFPs.[14]  Dealers that have established such information barriers should review their adequacy to ensure that the affiliated entities’ contributions, payments or PAC disbursement decisions are neither influenced by the dealer or its MFPs, nor communicated to the dealers and the MFPs.

The MSRB subsequently noted that the 2005 guidance did not establish an obligation to put in place the specific procedures and information barriers described in the guidance so long as the dealer in fact has and enforces other written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the conduct of the dealer and its MFPs are in compliance with Rule G-37(d).[15]  Thus, for example, when information regarding past or planned contributions of an affiliated PAC is or may be available to or known by the dealer or its MFPs, the dealer might establish and enforce written supervisory procedures that prohibit the dealer or MFP from providing information to issuer personnel regarding past or anticipated affiliated PAC contributions.

_______________________________________

[1] Rule G-37 defines municipal securities business as: (i) the purchase of a primary offering of municipal securities from an issuer on other than a competitive bid basis; (ii) the offer or sale of a primary offering of municipal securities on behalf of an issuer; (iii) the provision of financial advisory or consultant services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a primary offering of municipal securities in which the dealer was chosen to provide such services on other than a competitive bid basis; or (iv) the provision of remarketing agent services to or on behalf of an issuer with respect to a primary offering of municipal securities in which the dealer was chosen to provide such services on other than a competitive bid basis.

[2] The MSRB has previously stated that the matter of control depends upon whether or not the dealer or the MFP has the ability to direct or cause the direction of the management or policies of the PAC (MSRB Question & Answer No. IV. 24 – Dealer Controlled PAC).

[3] Rule G-37(d) provides that no broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer or any municipal finance professional shall, directly or indirectly, through or by any other person or means, do any act which would result in a violation of sections (b) or (c) of the rule. Section (b) relates to the ban on business and Section (c) relates to the prohibition on soliciting and coordinating contributions.

[4] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. IV.24 (May 24, 1994).

[5] MSRB Rule D-8 defines a bank dealer as a municipal securities dealer which is a bank or a separately identifiable department or division of a bank.

[6] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. IV.24 (May 24, 1994).

[7] However, a PAC created by an individual acting in his or her formal capacity as an officer, employee, director or other representative of a dealer, regardless of whether such individual is an MFP, would be deemed a dealer-controlled PAC rather than a PAC controlled by the individual.

[8] A dealer or an MFP may make sufficiently large or frequent contributions to a PAC so as to obtain effective control over the PAC, depending on the totality of facts and circumstances.

[9] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. III.7 (September 22, 2005) for a discussion of potential indirect contributions through affiliated PACs.

[10] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. III.4 (August 6, 1996).

[11] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. III.5 (August 6, 1996).

[12] Rule G-27, on supervision, provides in section (c) that each dealer shall adopt, maintain and enforce written supervisory procedures reasonably designed to ensure that the conduct of the municipal securities activities of the dealer and its associated persons are in compliance with MSRB rules.

[13] See Rule G-37 Question & Answer No. III.7 (September 22, 2005).

[14] The potential information barriers described in the guidance include: i) a prohibition on the dealer or MFP from recommending, nominating, appointing or approving the management of affiliated PACs; ii) a prohibition on sharing the affiliated PAC’s meeting agenda, meeting schedule, or meeting minutes; iii) a prohibition on identification of prior affiliated PAC contributions, planned PAC contributions or anticipated PAC contributions; iv) a prohibition on directly providing or coordinating information about prior negotiated municipal securities businesses, solicited municipal securities business, and planned solicitations of municipal securities business; and v) other such information barriers as the firms deems appropriate to monitor conflicting interest and prevent abuses effectively.

[15] See Rule G-37 Interpretive Letter – Supervisory procedures relating to indirect contributions; conference accounts and 527 organizations (December 21, 2006).

On December 22, 1987, the MSRB published a notice[1] interpreting the fair practice principles of Rule G-17 as they apply to the priority of orders for new issue securities (the “1987 notice”). The MSRB wishes to update the guidance provided in the 1987 notice due to changes in the marketplace and subsequent amendments to Rule G-11.

Rule G-11(e) requires syndicates to establish priority provisions and, if such priority provisions may be changed, to specify the procedure for making changes. The rule also permits a syndicate to allow the syndicate manager, on a case-by-case basis, to allocate securities in a manner other than in accordance with the priority provisions if the syndicate manager determines in its discretion that it is in the best interests of the syndicate. Under Rule G-11(f), syndicate managers must furnish information, in writing, to the syndicate members about terms and conditions required by the issuer,[2] priority provisions and the ability of the syndicate manager to allocate away from the priority provisions, among other things. Syndicate members must promptly furnish this information, in writing, to others upon request. This requirement was adopted to allow prospective purchasers to frame their orders to the syndicate in a manner that would enhance their ability to obtain securities since the syndicate’s allocation procedures would be known.

In addition to traditional priority provisions found in syndicate agreements, municipal securities underwriters frequently agree to other terms and conditions specified by the issuer of the securities relating to the distribution of the issuer’s securities. Such provisions include, but are not limited to, requirements concerning retail order periods. MSRB Rule G-17 states that, in the conduct of its municipal securities business, each broker, dealer, and municipal securities dealer (“dealer”) shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest or unfair practice. These requirements specifically apply to an underwriter’s activities conducted with a municipal securities issuer, including any commitments that the underwriter makes regarding the distribution of the issuer’s securities. An underwriter may violate the duty of fair dealing by making such commitments to the issuer and then failing to honor them. This could happen, for example, if an underwriter fails to accept, give priority to, or allocate to retail orders in conformance with the provisions agreed to in an undertaking to provide a retail order period. A dealer who wishes to allocate securities in a manner that is inconsistent with an issuer’s requirements must not do so without the issuer’s consent.

Except as otherwise provided in this notice, principles of fair dealing will require the syndicate manager to give priority to customer orders over orders for its own account, orders by other members of the syndicate for their own accounts, orders from persons controlling, controlled by, or under common control with any syndicate member (“affiliates”) for their own accounts, or orders for their respective related accounts,[3] to the extent feasible and consistent with the orderly distribution of securities in a primary offering. This principle may affect a wide range of dealers and their related accounts given changes in organizational structures due to consolidations, acquisitions, and other corporate actions that have, in many cases, resulted in increasing numbers of dealers, and their related dealer accounts, becoming affiliated with one another.

Rule G-17 does not require the syndicate manager to accord greater priority to customer orders over orders submitted by non-syndicate dealers (including selling group members). However, prioritization of customer orders over orders of non-syndicate dealers may be necessary to honor terms and conditions agreed to with issuers, such as requirements relating to retail orders.

The MSRB understands that syndicate managers must balance a number of competing interests in allocating securities in a primary offering and must be able quickly to determine when it is appropriate to allocate away from the priority provisions, to the extent consistent with the issuer’s requirements. Thus, Rule G-17 does not preclude the syndicate manager or managers from according equal or greater priority to orders by syndicate members for their own accounts, affiliates for their own accounts, or their respective related accounts if, on a case-by-case basis, the syndicate manager determines in its discretion that it is in the best interests of the syndicate. However, the syndicate manager shall have the burden of justifying that such allocation was in the best interests of the syndicate. Syndicate managers should ensure that all allocations, even those away from the priority provisions, are fair and reasonable and consistent with principles of fair dealing under Rule G-17.

It should be noted that all of the principles of fair dealing articulated in this notice extend to any underwriter of a primary offering, whether a sole underwriter, a syndicate manager, or a syndicate member.

Executive Summary

Brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (dealers or firms) must fully understand the bonds they sell in order to meet their disclosure, suitability and pricing obligations under the rules of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and federal securities laws. These obligations are not limited to firms involved in primary offerings. Dealers must also obtain, analyze and disclose all material facts about secondary market transactions that are known to the dealer, or that are reasonably accessible to the market through established industry sources.

Those sources include, among other things, official statements, continuing disclosures, trade data, and other information made available through the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access system (EMMA). Firms may also have a duty to obtain and disclose information that is not available through EMMA, if it is material and available through other public sources. The public availability of material information, through EMMA or otherwise, does not relieve a firm of its duty to disclose that information. Firms must also have reasonable grounds for determining that a recommendation is suitable based on information available from the issuer of the security or otherwise. Firms must also use this information to determine the prevailing market price of a security as the basis for establishing a fair price in a transaction with a customer. To meet these requirements, firms must perform an independent analysis of the bonds they sell, and may not rely solely on a bond’s credit rating.

Continuing disclosures made by issuers to the MSRB via EMMA are part of the information that dealers must obtain, disclose and consider in meeting their regulatory obligations. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has recently approved amendments to Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12, governing continuing disclosures. Firms that sell municipal securities should review and, if necessary, update their procedures to reflect the amendments, which have a compliance date of December 1, 2010.  

Background and Discussion

MSRB Disclosure, Suitability and Pricing Rules

MSRB Rule G-17 provides that, in the conduct of its municipal securities activities, each dealer must deal fairly with all persons and may not engage in any deceptive, dishonest or unfair practice. The MSRB has interpreted Rule G-17 to require a dealer, in connection with any transaction in municipal securities, to disclose to its customer, at or prior to the sale, all material facts about the transaction known by the dealer, as well as material facts about the security that are reasonably accessible to the market.[1] This includes the obligation to give customers a complete description of the security, including a description of the features that likely would be considered significant by a reasonable investor and facts that are material to assessing the potential risks of the investment.

Such disclosures must be made at the “time of trade,” which the MSRB defines as at or before the point at which the investor and the dealer agree to make the trade. Rule G-17 applies to all sales of municipal securities, whether or not a transaction was recommended by a broker-dealer.[2] This means that municipal securities dealers must disclose all information required to be disclosed by the rule even if the trade is self-directed.[3]

MSRB Rule G-19 requires that a dealer that recommends a municipal securities transaction have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the customer based upon information available from the issuer of the security or otherwise and the facts disclosed by, or otherwise known about, the customer.[4]

MSRB Rule G-30 requires that dealers trade with customers at prices that are fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all relevant factors.[5] The MSRB has stated that the concept of a “fair and reasonable” price includes the concept that the price must “bear a reasonable relationship to the prevailing market price of the security.” The impetus for the MSRB’s Real-time Transaction Reporting System (RTRS), which was implemented in January 2005, was to allow market participants to monitor market price levels on a real-time basis and thus assist them in identifying changes in market prices that may have been caused by news or market events.[6] The MSRB now makes the transaction data reported to RTRS available to the public through EMMA.

In meeting these disclosure, suitability and pricing obligations, firms must take into account all material information that is known to the firm or that is available through “established industry sources,” including official statements, continuing disclosures, and trade data, much of which is now available through EMMA. Resources outside of EMMA may include press releases, research reports and other data provided by independent sources. Established industry sources can also include material event notices and other data filed with former nationally recognized municipal securities information repositories (NRMSIRs) before July 1, 2009.[7] Therefore, firms should review their policies and procedures for obtaining material information about the bonds they sell to make sure they are reasonably designed to access all material information that is available, whether through EMMA or other established industry sources. The MSRB has also noted that the fact that material information is publicly available through EMMA does not relieve a firm of its duty to specifically disclose it to the customer at the time of trade, or to consider it in determining the suitability of a bond for a specific customer.[8] Importantly, the dealer may not simply direct the customer to EMMA to fulfill its time-of-trade disclosure obligations under Rule G-17.[9]

Amendments to Rule 15c2-12 Concerning Continuing Disclosure

Securities Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12 requires underwriters participating in municipal bond offerings that are subject to that rule[10] to receive, review, and distribute official statements of issuers of primary municipal securities offerings, and prohibits underwriters from purchasing or selling municipal securities covered by the rule unless they have first reasonably determined that the issuer or an obligated person[11] has contractually agreed to make certain continuing disclosures to the MSRB, including certain financial information and notice of certain events. The MSRB makes such disclosure public via EMMA.

Financial information to be disclosed under the rule consists of the following:

• Annual financial information updating the financial information in the official statement;
• Audited financial statements, if available and not included within the annual financial information; and
• Notices of failure to provide such financial information on a timely basis.

Currently, the rule enumerates the following as notice events, if material:

• Principal and interest payment delinquencies;
• Non-payment related defaults;
• Unscheduled draws on debt service reserves reflecting financial difficulties;
• Unscheduled draws on credit enhancements reflecting financial difficulties;
• Substitution of credit or liquidity providers or their failure to perform;
• Adverse tax opinions or events affecting the tax-exempt status of the security;
• Modifications to rights of security holders;
• Bond calls;
• Defeasances;
• Release, substitution or sale of property securing repayment of the securities; and
• Rating changes.

Rule 15c2-12(c) also prohibits any dealer from recommending the purchase or sale of a municipal security unless it has procedures in place that provide reasonable assurance that it will receive prompt notice of any event notice reported pursuant to the rule. Firms should review any applicable continuing disclosures made available through EMMA and other established industry sources and take such disclosures into account in undertaking its suitability and pricing determinations. 

On May 26, 2010, the SEC amended the rule’s disclosure obligations, with a compliance date of December 1, 2010, to: (1) apply continuing disclosure requirements to new primary offerings of certain variable rate demand obligations (VRDOs); (2) add four new notice events;[12] (3) remove the materiality standard for certain notice events;[13] and (4) require that event notices be filed in a timely manner but no later than 10 business days after their occurrence. With respect to the tax status of the security, the rule has been broadened to require disclosure of adverse tax opinions, issuance by the IRS of proposed or final determinations of taxability and other material notices, and determinations or events affecting the tax status of the bonds (including a Notice of Proposed Issue). Firms that deal in municipal securities should familiarize themselves with these amendments, and, if necessary, modify their policies and procedures to incorporate this additional disclosure accordingly. 

The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) noted in its Regulatory Notice 09-35 that, if a firm discovers through its Rule 15c2-12 procedures or otherwise that an issuer has failed to make filings required under its continuing disclosure agreements, the firm must take this information into consideration in meeting its disclosure obligations under MSRB Rule G-17 and in assessing the suitability of the issuer’s bonds under MSRB Rule G-19.

Credit Ratings

In order to meet their obligations under MSRB Rules G-17 and G-19, firms must analyze and disclose to customers the risks associated with the bonds they sell, including, but not limited to, the bond’s credit risk. A credit rating is a third-party opinion of the of the credit quality of a municipal security. While the MSRB generally considers credit ratings and rating changes to be material information for purposes of disclosure, suitability and pricing, they are only one factor to be considered, and dealers should not solely rely on credit ratings as a substitute for their own assessment of a bond’s credit risk. [14]  Moreover, different agencies use different quantitative and qualitative criteria and methodologies to determine their rating opinions.  Dealers should familiarize themselves with the rating systems used by rating agencies in order to understand and assess the relevance of a particular rating to the firm’s overall assessment of the bond.[15]. With respect to credit or liquidity enhanced securities, the MSRB has stated that material information includes the following, if known to the dealer or if reasonably available from established industry sources: (i) the credit rating of the issue or lack thereof; (ii) the underlying credit rating or lack thereof, (iii) the identity of any credit enhancer or liquidity provider; and (iv) the credit rating of the credit provider and liquidity provider, including potential rating actions (e.g., downgrade).[16]  Additionally, material terms of the credit facility or liquidity facility should be disclosed (e.g., any circumstances under which a standby bond purchase agreement would terminate without a mandatory tender).

Other Material Information 

In addition to a bond’s credit quality, firms must obtain, analyze and disclose other material information about a bond, including but not limited to whether the bond may be redeemed prior to maturity in-whole, in-part or in extraordinary circumstances,[17] whether the bond has non-standard features that may affect price or yield calculations,[18] whether the bond was issued with original issue discount or has other features that would affect its tax status,[19] and other key features likely to be considered significant by a reasonable investor.  For example, for VRDOs, auction rate securities or other securities for which interest payments may fluctuate, firms should explain to customers the basis on which periodic interest rate resets are determined.[20] The MSRB has stated that firms should take particular care with respect to new products that may be introduced into the municipal securities market, existing products that may have complex structures that can differ materially from issue to issue, and outstanding securities that may trade infrequently, may be issued by less well-known issuers, or may have unusual features.[21]

Supervision

Firms are reminded that MSRB Rule G-27 requires firms to supervise their municipal securities business, and to ensure that they have adequate policies and procedures in place for monitoring the effectiveness of their supervisory systems. Specifically, firms must:

• Supervise the conduct of the municipal securities activities of the firm and associated persons to ensure compliance with all MSRB rules, the Exchange Act and the rules there under;
• Have adequate written supervisory procedures; and
• Implement supervisory controls to ensure that their supervisory procedures are adequate.

Rule G-27 requires that a firm’s supervisory procedures provide for the regular and frequent review and approval by a designated principal of customer accounts introduced or carried by the dealer in which transactions in municipal securities are effected, with such review being designed to ensure that transactions are in accordance with all applicable rules and to detect and prevent irregularities and abuses. Although the rule does not establish a specific procedure for ensuring compliance with the requirement to provide disclosures to customers pursuant to Rule G-17, firms should consider including in their procedures for reviewing accounts and transactions specific processes for documenting or otherwise ascertaining that such disclosures have been made.  

Questions to Consider

Before selling any municipal bond, dealers should make sure that they fully understand the bonds they are selling in order to make adequate disclosure to customers under Rule G-17, to ensure that recommendations are suitable under Rule G-19, and to ensure that they are fairly priced under Rule G-30. Among other things, dealers should ask and be able to answer the following questions: 

• What are the bond’s key terms and features and structural characteristics, including but not limited to its issuer, source of funding (e.g., general obligation or revenue bond), repayment priority, and scheduled repayment rate? (Much of this information will be in the Official Statement, which for many municipal bonds can be obtained by entering the CUSIP number in the MuniSearch box at www.emma.msrb.org). Be aware, however, data in the Official Statement may have been superseded by the issuer’s on-going disclosures.
• Does information available through EMMA or other established industry sources indicate that an issuer is delinquent in  its material event notice and other continuing disclosure filings?  Delinquencies should be viewed as a red flag.
• What other public material information about the bond or its issuer is available through established industry sources other than EMMA?
• What is the bond’s rating? Has the issuer of the bond recently been downgraded? Has the issuer filed any recent default or other event notices, or has any other information become available through established industry sources that might call into question whether the published rating has been revised to take such event into consideration?
• Is the bond insured, or does it benefit from liquidity support, a letter of credit or is it otherwise supported by a third party? If so, check the credit rating of the bond insurer or other backing, and the bond’s underlying rating (without third party support). If supported by a third party, review the terms and conditions under which the third party support may terminate.
• How is it priced? Be aware that the price of a bond can be priced above or below its par value for many reasons, including changes in the creditworthiness of a bond's issuer and a host of other factors, including prevailing interest rates.
• How and when will interest on the bond be paid? Most municipal bonds pay semiannually, but zero coupon municipal bonds pay all interest at the time the bond matures. Variable rate bonds typically will pay interest more frequently, usually on a monthly basis in variable amounts.
• What is the bond’s tax status, under both state and federal laws? Is it subject to the Federal Alternate Minimum Tax? Is it fully taxable (e.g., Build America Bonds)?
• What are its call provisions? Call provisions allow the issuer to retire the bond before it matures. How would a call affect expected future income?

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) has recently provided guidance regarding the fair practice and related obligations of brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) to investors.[1] Specifically, MSRB Rule G-17, on conduct of municipal securities activities, states that, in the conduct of its municipal securities business, each dealer shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest, or unfair practice.  The MSRB is publishing this notice to remind dealers that the fair practice requirements of Rule G-17 also apply to their municipal securities activities with issuers of municipal securities.

As noted above, the fair practice requirements of Rule G-17 apply to all municipal securities activities of dealers with issuers.  In particular, even where other MSRB rules provide for specific disclosures or other actions by, or establish specific standards of behavior for, dealers with respect to or on behalf of issuers, such disclosures, actions or behavior must also comport with the fair practice principles of Rule G-17.  The MSRB will continue to review practices with respect to dealer activities with issuers.

[2] See Rule G-17 Interpretive Letter – Purchase of new issue from issuer, MSRB interpretation of December 1, 1997, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.

[3] See MSRB Rule G-20 Interpretation — Dealer payments in connection with the municipal securities issuance process, MSRB interpretation of January 29, 2007, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.

On April 24, 2009, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) published a notice clarifying that “Build America Bonds” and other tax credit bonds are municipal securities and, therefore, subject to MSRB rules.[1]  The MSRB understands that many of these securities contain certain redemption provisions, such as mandatory pro rata sinking funds, and that brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (collectively “dealers”) frequently effect transactions on a basis of “yield to average life.”  The MSRB reminds dealers that, for transactions effected on the basis of “yield to average life,” Rule G-15(a), on customer confirmations, requires the confirmation to display that yield as well as the yield computed to the lower of an “in whole” call or maturity.

Rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5) states requirements for dealers to calculate and display yields and dollar prices on customer confirmations.  For transactions effected on the basis of yield to maturity, call or put date, the yield at which the transaction was effected as well as a dollar price computed to the lower of an “in whole” call or maturity are required to be shown on a confirmation.  Similarly, for transactions effected on the basis of a dollar price, the dollar price at which the transaction was effected along with a yield computed to the lower of an “in whole” call or maturity are required to be shown on a confirmation. 

Sinking funds do not represent “in whole” call features.  Accordingly, MSRB confirmation requirements do not require dealers to compute yield or dollar price to a sinking fund call date or to compute a “yield to average life” using multiple sinking fund dates.  However, dealers should note that if the computed yield otherwise required by Rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5) is different than the yield at which the transaction was effected, Rule G-15(a)(i)(A)(5)(vii) provides that both the computed yield and the yield at which the transaction was effected must be shown on the confirmation.  Therefore, when a transaction is effected on the basis of “yield to average life,” such yield must be displayed on a customer confirmation. 

On July 14, 2009, the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, for immediate effectiveness, guidance on disclosure and other sales practice obligations of brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers to individual and other retail investors in municipal securities. [*] The text of the interpretive notice is contained below.

* * * * *

Significant participation by individual investors has long been a hallmark of the municipal securities market and, consequently, a focus of the core investor protection efforts of the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (the “MSRB”). [1] This Notice reminds brokers, dealers and municipal securities dealers (“dealers”) of their sales practice obligations under MSRB rules as applied specifically to individual and other retail investors. Among other things, this Notice updates guidance to dealers on (i) their obligations to disclose material information about issuers, their securities and credit/liquidity support for such securities in connection with the fulfillment of their disclosure obligations under MSRB Rule G-17, (ii) their obligations to use such material information in fulfilling their suitability obligations under MSRB Rule G-19, and (iii) their fair pricing obligations under MSRB Rules G-18 and G-30. [2] This Notice also applies previous guidance on bond insurance rating downgrades and wide-scale auction failures for municipal auction rate securities (“ARS”) to municipal securities transactions in general and specifically to transactions with individual and other retail investors in variable rate demand obligations (“VRDOs”). [3]

Basic Investor Protection Obligation

Rule G-17 is the core of the MSRB’s investor protection rules. It provides that, in the conduct of its municipal securities activities, each dealer shall deal fairly with all persons and shall not engage in any deceptive, dishonest or unfair practice. The rule contains an anti-fraud prohibition similar to the standard set forth in Rule 10b-5 adopted by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”). However, it also establishes a general duty to deal fairly, even in the absence of fraud. This general duty to deal fairly places several specific obligations on dealers with respect to their dealings with their customers, including the obligation to disclose material information, as described below. All activities of dealers must be viewed in light of these basic principles, regardless of whether other MSRB rules establish additional requirements on dealers.

Access to Material Information in the Municipal Securities Market

Many of the investor protection obligations established under MSRB rules are premised on dealer access to material information about municipal securities. Such access is fundamental not only to the ability of a dealer to meet its disclosure obligations to customers under MSRB rules but also to the ability of the dealer to undertake the necessary analyses to determine the suitability of a recommended municipal securities transaction and to determine the prevailing market price in connection with establishing a fair transaction price, among other things.

As professionals in the marketplace, dealers use a combination of internal resources and public and proprietary information sources to obtain the information necessary to conduct their business in a professional manner and to meet their disclosure and fair practice duties to investors. In 2002, the MSRB identified certain “established industry sources” in the municipal securities market that were available to and generally used by dealers that effect transactions in municipal securities. [4] While dealers and some institutional investors could readily access information from the established industry sources directly or through information vendors, most investors (and, in particular, individual investors) did not have ready access to many of the established industry sources and were largely limited to the information they could obtain through dealers.

With the advent of the MSRB’s Electronic Municipal Market Access system (“EMMA”) as a new established industry source, the amount, nature, timing and accessibility of information available to the entire marketplace, including both professionals and individual investors, has changed significantly since 2002. Official statements and other primary market disclosure documents, as well as continuing disclosure documents, are available to the general public through the EMMA web portal. Transaction price information is now available on a real-time basis, and comprehensive interest rate information for VRDOs and ARS also is available for the first time. All of this information is made available to the general public, at no cost, through the EMMA web portal, and also is available through subscription feeds to market participants and information vendors. It is expected that information vendors will continue to make this information available to their clients, together with increasing levels of value added products.

Disclosure of Material Information

General Disclosure Duty . Rule G-17 requires a dealer effecting a municipal securities transaction to disclose to its customer all material information about the transaction known by the dealer, as well as material information about the security that is reasonably accessible to the market. [5] Information available from established industry sources is deemed to be reasonably accessible to the market for purposes of this Rule G-17 disclosure obligation. Such disclosures must be made at or prior to the sale of municipal securities to the investor (i.e., when the investor and the dealer agree to make the trade), also referred to as the “time of trade.” This is a key protection mandated by MSRB rules. [6] This disclosure duty applies to any municipal securities transaction, regardless of whether the dealer is acting as a so-called “order-taker” (as when the trade is “unsolicited”), whether the transaction is recommended, or whether the transaction is a primary or secondary market trade. [7] Dealers continue to be obligated to make the required time of trade disclosures to their customers mandated by Rule G-17, notwithstanding the availability to investors of comprehensive information from EMMA and other established industry sources.

In general, information is considered “material” if there is a substantial likelihood that its disclosure would have been considered important or significant by a reasonable investor. [8] The duty to disclose material information to a customer in a municipal securities transaction includes the duty to give a complete description of the security, including a description of the features that likely would be considered significant by a reasonable investor and facts that are material to assessing the potential risks of the investment. [9] For VRDOs, ARS or other securities for which interest payments may fluctuate, such material facts would include a description of the basis on which periodic interest rate resets are determined.

The scope of material information that dealers are obligated to disclose to their customers under Rule G-17 is not limited solely to the information made available through established industry sources. Dealers also must disclose material information they know about the securities even if such information is not then available from established industry sources. It is essential that dealers establish procedures reasonably designed to ensure that information known to the dealer is communicated internally or otherwise made available to relevant personnel in a manner reasonably designed to ensure compliance with this disclosure obligation.

Disclosures with Respect to Credit/Liquidity Enhancement and Ratings . The MSRB previously has provided guidance on specific disclosures that may be required in connection with insured municipal securities, including in particular insured ratings, underlying ratings and potential rating actions disclosed by the rating agencies. [10] The principles enunciated with respect to insured bonds also are generally applicable in connection with any third-party credit enhancement provided with respect to municipal securities, regardless of the type of such enhancement. This disclosure obligation extends to enhancements such as, without limitation, letters of credit, surety bonds, state or federal agency enhancements, and other similar products or programs.

For VRDOs, dealers generally must consider factors relevant to both the long-term nature of the securities as well as short-term liquidity features of such securities. Banks or other financial institutions (collectively, “banks”) may issue letters of credit or similar product (“LOCs”), which provide both long-term credit support (by guaranteeing payment of principal and interest on VRDOs) and short-term liquidity support (by guaranteeing the purchase price of tendered VRDOs). Alternatively, banks may provide only liquidity support for tendered VRDOs, through a standby bond purchase agreement or similar product (“SBPA”). Typically, an SBPA is used when the issuer has a strong credit rating by itself or it is coupled with bond insurance. However, while LOCs are generally irrevocable for the term of the LOC, that is frequently not the case with SBPAs. Some SBPAs are structured so that certain negative credit or other events with regard to the issue or bond insurer result in the immediate termination of the SBPA and the loss of liquidity support, without a prior mandatory tender of the bonds. [11] If such an immediate termination event occurs, investors are left holding long-term, floating-rate bonds with no tender right.

The role of the remarketing agent also may be material to investors. If the remarketing agent for a VRDO has customarily or from time-to-time taken tendered bonds into inventory to make it unnecessary to draw on the liquidity facility for unremarketed bonds (thereby in effect providing liquidity support), the fact that the remarketing agent is not contractually obligated to maintain such practice will generally be material information required to be disclosed to customers to which VRDOs are sold.

The following information will generally be material information required to be disclosed to investors in credit/liquidity enhanced securities, including but not limited to VRDOs, if known to the dealer or if reasonably available from established industry sources: (i) the credit rating of the issue or lack thereof; (ii) the underlying credit rating or lack thereof, (iii) the identity of any credit enhancer or liquidity provider; and (iv) the credit rating of the credit provider and liquidity provider, including potential rating actions (e.g., downgrade). Additionally, material terms of the credit facility or liquidity facility should be disclosed (e.g., any circumstances under which an SBPA would terminate without a mandatory tender). This list is not exhaustive. Other information may also be material to investors in credit/liquidity enhanced securities.

Other Investor Protection Obligations

Although disclosure to investors is a key customer protection duty of dealers under MSRB rules, other important customer protection rules also apply. Thus, dealers are reminded that they are not relieved of their suitability obligations under MSRB Rule G-19 simply by disclosing material information to the customer. They are also not relieved of their fair pricing obligations to their customers under MSRB Rules G-18 and G-30 by disclosing material information to investors. The information known by a dealer in connection with a municipal security, together with the information available from established industry sources, generally should inform the dealer, to the extent applicable, in undertaking the necessary analyses and determinations needed to meet these other customer protection obligations.

Suitability of Recommendations . Under MSRB Rule G-19, a dealer that recommends a municipal securities transaction to a customer must have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable, based upon information available from the issuer of the security or otherwise (including from established industry sources) and the facts disclosed by or otherwise known about the customer. [12] To assure that a dealer effecting a recommended transaction with an individual investor has the information needed about the investor to make its suitability determination, the rule requires the dealer to make reasonable efforts to obtain information concerning the investor’s financial status, tax status and investment objectives, as well as any other information reasonable and necessary in making the recommendation. [13]

Dealers are reminded that the obligation arising under Rule G-19 in connection with a recommended transaction requires a meaningful analysis, [14] taking into consideration the information obtained about the investor and the security, which establishes the reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable. Such suitability determinations are required regardless of the apparent safety of a particular security or issuer or the apparent wealth or sophistication of a particular investor. Suitability determinations should be based on the appropriately weighted factors that are relevant in any particular set of facts and circumstances, and those factors may vary from transaction to transaction. Factors to be considered include, but are not limited to, the investor’s financial profile, tax status, investment objectives (including portfolio concentration/diversification), and the specific characteristics and risks of the municipal security recommended to the investor.

The MSRB notes that Section (c) of Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12 provides that it is impermissible for a dealer to recommend the purchase or sale of a municipal security unless the dealer has procedures in place that provide reasonable assurance that it will receive prompt notice of the specified material events that are subject to the continuing disclosure obligations of the rule. A dealer would be expected to have reviewed any applicable continuing disclosures made available through EMMA or other established industry sources and to have taken such disclosures into account in undertaking its suitability determination.

With regard to credit-enhanced securities, facts relating to the credit rating of the credit enhancer may affect suitability determinations, particularly for investors who have conveyed to the dealer investment objectives relating to credit quality of investments. For example, if a customer has expressed the desire to purchase only “triple A” rated securities, recommendations to the customer should take into account information from rating agencies, including information about potential rating actions that may affect the future “triple A” status of the issue. In the case of recommended VRDOs or any other securities that are viewed as providing significant liquidity to investors, a dealer must consider both the liquidity characteristics of the security and the investor’s need for a liquid investment when making a suitability determination. Facts relating to the short-term credit rating, if any, of the LOC or SBPA provider, or of any other third-party liquidity facility provider, generally would affect suitability determinations in such securities. To the extent that an investor seeks to invest in VRDOs due to their liquidity characteristics, a suitability analysis also generally would require a dealer, in recommending a VRDO to an individual investor, to consider carefully the circumstances, if any, under which the liquidity feature may no longer be effectively available to the customer.

It is incumbent upon any dealer wishing to market municipal securities to customers that it understand the material features of the security, particularly if such dealer is to fulfill its obligation to undertake a suitability determination in connection with a recommended transaction. Dealers should take particular care with respect to new products that may be introduced into the municipal securities market, [15] existing products that may have complex structures that can differ materially from issue to issue, and outstanding securities that may trade infrequently, may be issued by less well-known issuers, or may have unusual features. Dealers are reminded that they must review the relevant disclosure documents to become familiar with the specific characteristics of the product, including the tax features, prior to recommending such products to their customers.

Fair Pricing . MSRB Rule G-30(a) establishes the pricing obligation of dealers in principal transactions between dealers and customers. The rule provides that the aggregate transaction price to the customer must be fair and reasonable, taking into consideration all relevant factors. A “fair and reasonable” price is one that bears a reasonable relationship to the prevailing market price of the security. [16] Dealers have a similar obligation with respect to the price of securities sold in agency transactions pursuant to Rule G-18. Dealer compensation on a principal transaction is considered to be a mark-up or mark-down that is computed from the inter-dealer market price prevailing at the time of the customer transaction, while compensation on an agency transaction generally consists of a commission. As part of the aggregate price to the customer, the mark-up or mark-down also must be fair and reasonable, taking into account all relevant factors. [17] Similarly, under Rule G-30(b), the commission on an agency transaction must be fair and reasonable, taking into account all relevant factors.

As a general matter, in addition to information about prices of transactions effected by such dealers and other market participants in such security, material information about a security available through EMMA or other established industry sources may also be among the relevant factors that the dealer should consider in connection with ensuring fair pricing of its transactions with investors. Among other things, dealers would be expected to have reviewed any applicable continuing disclosures made available through EMMA or other established industry sources and to have taken such disclosures into account in determining a fair and reasonable transaction price. In addition, dealers should consider the effect of ratings on the value of the securities involved in customer transactions, and should specifically consider the effect of information from rating agencies, both with respect to actual or potential changes in the underlying rating of a security and with respect to actual or potential changes in the rating of any third-party credit enhancement applicable to the security.

Finally, many issuers currently include a retail order period in the marketing of new issues. The retail order period is intended to provide an opportunity for individual investors to place orders in advance of institutional investors. Dealers are reminded that an issuer’s use of a retail order period based on a perception that the retail order period will improve pricing of the new issue for the issuer does not create a safe harbor for dealers to engage in pricing that violates the fair pricing obligation under Rule G-30. Large differences between institutional and individual prices that exceed the price/yield variance that normally applies to transactions of different sizes in the primary market provide evidence that the duty of fair pricing to individual clients may not have been met.

[1] See Federal Reserve Flow of Funds , Table L-211 (June 11, 2009) available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/ (The household category in the Table reflects direct investments by individual investors, as well as investments by trusts, investment advisors, arbitrageurs, and various other accounts that do not fall into other tracked categories).

[2] See Reminder of Customer Protection Obligations in Connection With Sales of Municipal Securities , MSRB Notice 2007-17 (May 30, 2007) (the “Fair Practice Notice”); Interpretation on Customer Protection Obligations Relating to the Marketing of 529 College Savings Plans , MSRB Notice 2006-23 (August 7, 2006) (the “529 Notice”).

[3] See Application of MSRB Rules to Transactions in Auction Rate Securities , MSRB Notice 2008-09 (February 19, 2008) (the “ARS Notice”); Bond Insurance Ratings Application of MSRB Rules, MSRB Notice 2008-04 (January 22, 2008) (the “Bond Insurance Notice”).

[4] See Rule G-17 Interpretation – Interpretive Notice Regarding Rule G-17, on Disclosure of Material Facts, March 20, 2002 , reprinted in MSRB Rule Book (the “2002 Disclosure Notice”). The 2002 Disclosure Notice described these established industry sources as including such sources as the system of nationally recognized municipal securities information repositories (“NRMSIRs”) established by the SEC under Exchange Act Rule 15c2-12 for continuing disclosures by issuers and other obligors, the MSRB’s Municipal Securities Information Library ^® (MSIL^®) system for official statements and advance refunding documents, the MSRB’s Transaction Reporting System for prices of transactions in municipal securities, rating agency reports, and other sources of information on municipal securities generally used by dealers that effect transactions in the type of securities at issue.

[5] See 2002 Disclosure Notice, supra n.4.

[6] Additional MSRB disclosure requirements under Rule G-15, relating to trade confirmations, and Rule G-32, relating to official statements, focus on information to be provided after the investment decision and do not fulfill the Rule G-17 disclosure obligation because they are not provided at or prior to the investment decision. Recent amendments to MSRB Rule G-32 in connection with electronic dissemination of official statements to investors purchasing municipal securities in a primary offering do not alter this time-of-trade disclosure obligation.

[7] A dealer’s specific investor protection obligations, including its disclosure, fair practice and suitability obligations under Rules G-17 and G-19, may be affected by the status of an institutional investor as a Sophisticated Municipal Market Professional (“SMMP”). See Rule G-17 Interpretation – Notice Regarding the Application of MSRB Rules to Transactions with Sophisticated Municipal Market Professionals, April 30, 2002, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.

[8] See ARS Notice and Bond Insurance Notice; see also Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). The SEC has described material facts as those “facts which a prudent investor should know in order to evaluate the offering before reaching an investment decision.” Municipal Securities Disclosure, Exchange Act Release No. 26100 (September 22, 1988) at note 76, quoting In re Walston & Co. Inc., and Harrington, Exchange Act Release No. 8165 (September 22, 1967).

[9] See, e.g., Rule G-17 Interpretation – Educational Notice on Bonds Subject to “Detachable” Call Features, May 13, 1993, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book; Rule G-17 Interpretation – Notice Concerning Disclosure of Call Information to Customers of Municipal Securities, March 4, 1986, reprinted in MSRB Rule Book.

[10] See Bond Insurance Notice, supra n.3.

[11] The termination of the SBPA may result in other changes to the terms of securities, such as the loss of any rights to tender the securities for purchase or an interest rate to be determined based on a floating rate index or in another manner, which may produce a yield that is substantially below market for a fixed rate bond of comparable maturity. Such facts may be material to investors.

[12] See, e.g., Fair Practice Notice, supra n.2. The MSRB has previously stated that most situations in which a dealer brings a municipal security to the attention of a customer involve an implicit recommendation of the security to the customer, but determining whether a particular transaction is in fact recommended depends on an analysis of all the relevant facts and circumstances. See Rule G-19 Interpretive Letter – Recommendations, February 17, 1998, published in MSRB Rule Book. The MSRB also has provided guidance on recommendations in the context of on-line communications in Rule G-19 Interpretation – Notice Regarding Application of Rule G-19, on Suitability of Recommendations and Transactions, to Online Communications, September 25, 2002, published in MSRB Rule Book.

[13] Rule G-8(a)(xi)(F) requires that dealers maintain records for each customer of such information about the customer used in making recommendations to the customer.

[14] See 529 Notice n.2; Fair Practice Notice n.2; Bond Insurance Notice n. 3.

[15] From time to time, the MSRB provides guidance on specific new products introduced into the municipal securities market. For example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 authorized state and local governments to issue two types of Build America Bonds (“BABs”) as taxable governmental bonds with federal subsidies for a portion of their borrowing costs. The MSRB has previously provided guidance to dealers regarding the application of MSRB rules to BABs, including fair practice rules. See Build America Bonds and Other Tax Credit Bonds, MSRB Notice 2009-15 (April 24, 2009) ; Build America Bonds: Application of Rule G-37 to Solicitations of Issuers , MSRB Notice 2009-30 (June 9, 2009) . In addition, the MSRB has provided guidance on dealer transactions in registered warrants, or IOUs, issued by the State of California. See Applicability of MSRB Rules to California Registered Warrants, MSRB Notice 2009-41 (July 10, 2009) . Nonetheless, dealers must understand the material features of any security they recommend, regardless of whether specific guidance is provided by the MSRB.

[16] See Review of Dealer Pricing Responsibilities, MSRB Notice 2004-3 (January 26, 2004) (the “Dealer Pricing Notice”).

[17] Dealer Pricing Notice, supra.

MSRB PUBLISHES INTERPRETIVE LETTER REGARDING SOLICITATION ACTIVITY ON BEHALF OF AN AFFILIATED COMPANY PURSUANT TO RULES G-37 AND G-38

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board has published an interpretive letter pursuant to Rule G-37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business, and Rule G-38, on solicitation of municipal securities business, concerning the activities of a broker-dealer on behalf of an affiliated company. The text of the interpretive letter is included below. Questions regarding the interpretive letter may be directed to Leslie Carey, Associate General Counsel, or Ronald W. Smith, Senior Legal Associate. 

July 2, 2009

*  *  *  *  *

TEXT OF INTERPRETIVE LETTER

Rules G-37 and G-38 Interpretive Letter – Solicitation activity on behalf of affiliated company.  This is in response to your April 29, 2009 letter seeking guidance regarding Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”) Rule G-38, on solicitation of municipal securities business, and MSRB Rule G-37, on political contributions and prohibitions on municipal securities business. Your letter relates to the formation of a joint venture broker-dealer (“JV B-D”) by two existing broker-dealers (the “legacy firms”). You state that JV B-D will not engage in municipal securities business[1] and that the employees of JV B-D will not retain their employment status with the legacy firms, but will be associated persons of both legacy firms.

Specifically, you request guidance on the following two issues: (i) whether the employees of the JV B-D may solicit municipal securities business, under Rule G-38, on behalf of the legacy firms; and (ii) whether an employee who solicits municipal securities business on behalf of one of the legacy firms will be considered a municipal finance professional (“MFP”) [2] solely of the legacy firm on whose behalf the MFP solicits municipal securities business under Rule G-37, rather than of both legacy firms. The Board has reviewed your letter and authorized this response.

JV B-D Employee Solicitation of Municipal Securities Business on Behalf of Legacy Firms: You ask whether employees of JV B-D, who are the prior employees of the legacy firms, may solicit municipal securities business on behalf of such firms under Rule G-38. Rule G-38(a) prohibits a broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer (“dealer”) from providing, directly or indirectly, payment to any person who is not an affiliated person[3] of the dealer for a solicitation of municipal securities business on behalf of such dealer.

You state that JV B-D will be controlled by the legacy firms and, as such, should be viewed as an affiliated company[4] of the legacy firms. Under Rule G-38, if JV B-D is controlled by the legacy firms, JV B-D and its employees should be viewed as affiliates of the legacy firms. Based on the control relationships you describe, Rule G-38 will not be violated if employees of JV B-D are paid by a legacy firm for a solicitation of municipal securities business on behalf of such legacy firms.

JV B-D Employee Status as Municipal Finance Professional for Legacy Firm on Behalf of Which the Employee Has Solicited Municipal Securities Business: You also ask whether an employee of JV B-D who solicits municipal securities business on behalf of one of the legacy firms will be considered an MFP solely of the legacy firm on whose behalf the employee solicits municipal securities business, rather than of both legacy firms. Rule G-37(g)(iv)(B) defines MFP, in relevant part, as any associated person (including, but not limited to, any affiliated person of the dealer, as defined in Rule G-38) who solicits municipal securities business (a “solicitor MFP”). You note that this language does not expressly limit MFP status to the dealer on whose behalf the municipal securities business was solicited.

The MSRB is of the view that implicit in the concept of a solicitor MFP, as set forth in Rule G-37(g)(iv)(B), is the notion that an associated person who solicits municipal securities business on behalf of a dealer becomes an MFP of such dealer.[5] Although an individual who solicits municipal securities business on behalf of one dealer with which he or she is associated thereby becomes an MFP of such dealer, the solicitation does not by itself result in the individual becoming an MFP of a different dealer with which such individual may be associated but for which he or she has not solicited municipal securities business. Rather, such individual would have to undertake a solicitation or another activity described in Rule G-37(g)(iv) on behalf of the second dealer in order to become an MFP of such second dealer.

The MSRB notes that Rule G-38(b)(i) defines solicitation broadly to mean, any direct or indirect communication with an issuer for the purpose of obtaining or retaining municipal securities business. The MSRB has previously provided guidance regarding the types of communications that are viewed as solicitations of municipal securities business.[6] Depending upon specific facts and circumstances, a direct solicitation of municipal securities business by an individual on behalf of a dealer with which such individual is associated (the “directly-benefited dealer”) might also be considered an indirect solicitation of business on behalf of another dealer with which such individual is associated (the “indirectly-benefited dealer”). In conversations with issuers or other third parties, the individual must clearly indicate for which dealer he or she is soliciting business. For example, an individual who describes to issuer personnel two or more affiliated dealers as leading underwriting firms in that issuer’s state but only explicitly asks such personnel to hire one dealer (i.e., the directly-benefited dealer) would likely be considered to have indirectly solicited business on behalf of the other dealer as well (i.e., the indirectly-benefited dealer). An important factor in determining whether a direct solicitation on behalf of a directly-benefited dealer could also be considered an indirect solicitation on behalf of an indirectly-benefited dealer is whether the individual solely identifies his or her affiliation with the directly-benefited dealer or also identifies an affiliation with the other dealer.[7]  To the extent that multiple dealers are identified directly or indirectly, dealers would need to take extra precautions to ensure that the solicited issuer personnel understand that the solicitation is solely on behalf of the directly-benefited dealer and that the identification of the other firm is limited and does not serve to promote the other firm.[8] In circumstances similar to those described in this letter, dealers should have in place effective procedures to ensure that the solicitations for municipal securities business are tracked in a way that will properly classify individuals making solicitations as MFPs of the appropriate dealer. MSRB Interpretation of June 23, 2009.