Supervisory structure.  This is in response to your letter of December 31, 1986 and our subsequent telephone conversation. You note that there has been a recent reorganization within your bank. As a consequence, you, as the head of the dealer department, now will report to the bank officer who also is in charge of the trust department and the bank's investment portfolio, rather than directly to the bank's president as had been the case. You ask whether this arrangement might constitute a conflict of interest under trust regulations or otherwise under Board rules.

Board rule G-27 places an obligation upon a dealer to supervise its municipal securities activities. It requires a dealer to accomplish this objective by designating individuals with supervisory responsibility for municipal securities activities and requires the dealer to adopt written supervisory procedures to this end. The rule does not specify how a dealer should structure its supervisory procedures, provided that the dealer adopts an organizational structure which meets the intent of the rule. You should review your dealer's written supervisory procedures to ensure that they provide for the appropriate delegation of supervisory responsibilities, given the reorganization within the bank.

You noted that the individual to whom you will be reporting is presently qualified as a municipal securities representative but not as a municipal securities principal. Board rule G-3(a)(i)^[*] defines a municipal securities principal as an associated person of a securities firm or bank dealer who is directly engaged in the management, direction or supervision of municipal securities activities. If, under the new reorganization, this individual will be designated with day-to-day responsibility for the management, direction or supervision of the municipal securities activities of the dealer, then he must be qualified as a municipal securities principal.

Finally, trust regulations are governed by the appropriate banking law and not by Board rules. Consequently, any concerns that you may have with respect to possible conflicts of interest with trust regulations should be directed to the appropriate bank regulatory agency. MSRB interpretation of March 11, 1987.

^[*] [Currently codified at rule G-3(b)(i).]

"Municipal Securities Principal" defined. This is in response to your letter of January 28, 1987, and subsequent telephone conversations with the Board's staff, requesting an interpretation of Board rule G-3(a)(i)[*], the definition of the term "Municipal Securities Principal". You ask whether an individual, who has day-to-day responsibility for directing the municipal underwriting activities of a firm, must be qualified as a municipal securities principal. You suggest that such activity seems to meet the definition of a municipal securities principal, namely, an individual who is "directly engaged in the management, direction or supervision of. . .underwriting . . .of municipal securities." You note that this individual has the authority to make underwriting commitments in the name of the firm, but that the firm's president is designated with supervisory responsibility for this individual's underwriting activity. Also, you indicated that this individual does not have supervisory responsibility for any other representative.

Your request for an interpretation was referred to a Committee of the Board which has responsibility for professional qualification matters. The Committee concluded that the individual you describe would not be required to qualify as a municipal securities principal, provided that her responsibilities are limited to directing the day-to-day underwriting activities of the dealer, and provided that these responsibilities are carried out within policy guidelines established by the dealer and under the direct supervision of a municipal securities principal. The Committee is also of the opinion that commitment authority alone is not indicative of principal activity, but rather is inherent in the underwriting activities of a municipal securities representative. MSRB interpretation of February 27, 1987.

[*][Currently codified at rule G-3(b)(i)]

Disqualification of municipal securities principals. In our recent telephone conversation you asked whether the Board has interpreted rule G-3(c)(iv)[*] as to the qualification status of a municipal securities principal in circumstances where the bank dealer, with which the individual is associated, fails to effect a municipal security transaction for a period of two or more years. You proposed that, if there are no municipal securities transactions for the principal to supervise, the individual would not be considered to be "acting as a municipal securities principal" and, consequently, the individual's qualification as a municipal securities principal would lapse after a two-year period of such inactivity.

The Board has considered a similar situation and given an interpretation in the matter. It reaffirmed the interpretation that an individual whose responsibilities no longer include supervision of municipal securities activities probably will not be able to remain adequately informed in the supervisory and compliance matters of concern to municipal securities principals, and that continuing association with a municipal securities dealer, in a capacity other than that of a municipal securities principal, is not sufficient to maintain qualification as a municipal securities principal. However, the Board also concluded that it did not intend this interpretation of rule G-3(c)(iv)[*] to mean that a dealer must necessarily effect transactions in municipal securities in order for its municipal securities principal to maintain such qualification. The Board noted that the definition of a municipal securities principal not only includes supervision of trading or sales, but of other municipal securities activities as well. Consequently, the Board determined that the qualification of a municipal securities principal should not automatically terminate because the individual is associated with a municipal securities broker or dealer which has not effected a municipal securities transaction in two or more years, but that to maintain such qualification the individual must demonstrate clearly that:

--the municipal securities broker or dealer was engaged in municipal securities activity during this period (e.g., determinations of suitability involving municipal securities, recommendations to customers, advertising, financial advisory activity with respect to municipal issuers); and

--the individual in question had been designated with supervisory responsibility for such municipal securities activities during this period.

MSRB interpretation of January 15, 1987

[*] [Currently codified at rule G-3(b)(ii)(C)]

Board rule G-3(a)(iii)[*] defines municipal securities representative activities to include any activity which involves communication with public investors regarding the sale of municipal securities but exempts activities that are solely clerical or ministerial. As you noted, in December 1984, the Board issued an interpretation of rule G-3 which states that individuals who solicit new account business are not engaging in clerical or ministerial activities but rather are communicating with public investors regarding the sale of municipal securities and thus are engaging in municipal securities representative activities which require such individuals to be qualified as representatives under the Board’s rules. Examples of solicitation of new account business stated in the notice included “cold calls” to individuals during which the non-qualified individual introduces the services offered by the dealers, prequalified potential customers, or suggests the purchase of specific securities currently being offered by a municipal securities dealer. An individual who introduces the name of the municipal securities dealer and inquires as to the type of securities in which a portfolio manager invests would be communicating with the public in an attempt to prequalify potential customers and thus must be qualified as a municipal securities representative. MSRB interpretation of January 5, 1987.

[*] [Currently codified at rule G-3(a)(i).]